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SECTION A
FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT (15 V.S.C.A. § 1692)
1. HISTORY OF THE ACT (15 U.S.C. § 1692).
Prior to the enactment ofthe Fair Debt Collection Practices Act I (the "Act"), debtors seeking
recourse against debt collectors had to resort to common law tort claims, such as invasion ofprivacy,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, false imprisonment, libel and slander, malicious
prosecution and abuse ofprocess or assault and battery. Most often these claims were difficult to
prove. Also, even victorious plaintiffs rarely came out ahead because of the added effect of the
"American Rule" that requires each side pay its own attorneys' fees. An example of the types of
activities engaged in by debt collectors and the relative lack ofsuccess attained by debtors through
common la\v claims is highlighted in Public Finance Corp. v. Davis.2
In Public Finance Corp., a debt collector phoned and visited the debtor's home repeatedly.
The debt collector also called the debtor at the hospital when she \vas visiting her sick daughter,
induced the debtor to \vrite a check for the debt by promising not to cash it until later and then
phoned a friend ofthe debtor and informed her that the debtor was writing bad checks. During one
visit to the debtor's household, the debt collector asked ifhe could use the phone to call a colleague
and, once inside, used the telephone to give the colleague an inventory of the debtor's household
goods, presumably for later repossessiori. The debtor eventually filed suit alleging intentional
infliction of emotional distress. The court denied the claim holding that these acts were not "so
outrageous in character and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds ofdecency."3
After a number of congressional hearings conducted before the Consumer Affairs
Subcommittee ofthe Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs in the mid - 1970's,
Congress acknowledged that debt collection abuse by third party collectors was a serious national
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problem. The Subcommittee found that the main reason for such widespread abusive practices was
the lack of any regulation of the industry at the state level. At that time, there \vere thirteen (13)
states, Kentucky among them, that had no debt collection laws. Another eleven (11) states had some
type oflaw in effect but were, in the opinion ofthe Senate Subcommittee, ineffective to control debt
collection abuse.
Since third-party collectors usually operated on a commission basis, the Subcommittee found
that many did not care what effect their tactics had on consumers. Moreover, the use of WATS
lines4 and other discounted long-distance calling arrangements was found to have increased interstate
collections, thus making it difficult for states to crack down on illegal debt collection practices
conducted across state lines.
In response to these continuously compounding difficulties, Congress established the Act as
a new title to the Consumer Credit Protection Act in 1977.5 The passage of the Act was supported
by most ofthe groups it would affect including consumer groups, labor unions, state and Federalla\v
enforcement officials, and even the debt collection industry itself: Since all debt collectors are
regulated under the Act, none are competitively disadvantaged.
2. PARTIES AFFECTED (15 U.S.C. § 1692a).
2.1 TI,e Act Applies To I"depe"de"t Debt Collectors.
The act regulates only the collection of consumer debts which are primarily for
personal, family or household purposes.6 It has no application to the collection of commercial
accounts. Further, the Act regulates the activities ofpersons who regularly collect consumer debts
for others, i.e., independent debt collectors.' It does not apply when a creditor is acting to collect
a debt which is owed to it.
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While the Act only applies to the actions of"debt collectors," "debt collectors" can also be
found vicariously liable for the acts of their agents. In Ditty v. CheckRite, for example, the court
held that CheckRite, who was a debt collector, could be held vicariously liable for the actions ofits
attorney.8 As such, violations of the Act by counsel for a debt collector can expose the debt
collector to liability as well. Contrarily, non-debt collectors will not be found liable for the actions
of a debt collector as the Act only imposes liability upon debt collectors.9
More specifically, the Act applies to:
(a) Persons who use interstate commerce or the mails in any business, the
primary purpose ofwhich is the collection ofdebts. lo A typical collection agency uses the telephone
and the mail, thus subjecting itself to regulation under the Act.
(b) Persons who regularly collect debts owed to another. I I This includes the
typical collection agency but also includes persons who regularly collect debts, but are not
necessarily in a business with the primary purpose ofcollecting debts. This could include attorneys,
credit reporting agencies or creditors who have a reciprocal agreement to collect the other's debts.
(c) Creditors who use a name other than their own to collect debts, so that it
appears as if a third party is collecting for it. 12
(d) Professional repossessors or repossession companies who use interstate
commerce (phone, mails, fax, etc.) and who take or threaten action to repossess collateral where
there is no present right to possession, or no present intention to take possession, or the collateral is
exempt. 13
(e) Persons who design fonns to sell to creditors, which fonns are designed
to convey to a consumer, when mailed to the consumer by the creditor, that a third party is involved
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in collecting the debt, when such is not the case. 14 This practice is commonly referred to as "flat..
rating."
All ofthe persons engaged in activities as described above are "debt collectors" under
the Act and must therefore comply with its provisions.
2.2 Excluded Parties.
Conversely, the term "debt collector" does not include the following persons:
(a) "in-house" collectors for creditors as long as they use the creditor's name
in collection efforts1S (note: as creditors continue expanding their in-house collections, more and
more debts are collected outside the reaches of the Act);
(b) affiliated companies collecting for each other as long as they only collect
for other related entities and are not in the principal business of debt collection;16
(c) federal or state employees/officials ifcollecting debts in the perfonnance
of their official duties;17
(d) process servers while serving or attempting to serve legal process;18
(e) non-profit consumer credit counseling services/agencies;19
(j) fiduciaries, such as trust departments, escrow companies or others acting
in a legitimate fiduciary capacity;20
(g) mortgages, mortgage servicing companies and others who service
outstanding debts for others, as long as the debts were not in default \vhen taken for servicing;21
(II) collection of debts owed to a creditor when the collector is holding
account receivables as collateral for commercial credit extended to the creditor;22 and
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(i) attorneys engaged in activities which qualify them to be called "debt
collectors." 23
An attorney will be subject to the requirements ofthe FDCPA ifhe or she "regularly
collects" consumer debt for his or her clients.24 Whether an attorney "regularly collects" consumer
debt is detennined on case by case basis, but courts have found the following factors relevant: (1)
the percentage of revenue generated by debt collection activities, (2) the sheer volume of debt
collection activities; and (3) whether the attorney has an on-going relationship with a collection
agency."25
An attorney does not need substantial activity to be a debt collector.26 "The word 'regular'
is not synonymous with the word 'substantial. '''27 Occasionally, a court will hold that an attorney
who only rarely collects debts is not covered by the Act.28 The most prudent course remains that an
attorney handling a consumer debt collection matter should assume that he or she is covered by the
Act.
2.3 Defillitioll ofCOIISlllller Debt.
The term "debt" means any obligation or alleged obligation of a consumer to pay
money arising out of a transaction in \vhich the money, property, insurance, or services which are
the subject of the transaction are primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, whether or
not such obligation has been reduced to judgment.29
Moreover, the question as to what constitutes "consumer debt" has recently been
interpreted more broadly by some courts and has been found to does/does not include:
(aJ does: collecting dishonored checks even though they \vere not issued in
a credit transaction; 30
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(b) does: eviction actions;31 or
(c) does: condominium homeowners' association dues and assessments;32
(d) does not: collecting taxes;33
(e) does not: torts and criminal acts;34
(j) does not: business debt;3S and
(g) does not: child support.36
3. ACTIONS PERMITTED (15 U.S.C. § 1692b, § 1692c).
The drafters recognized that the Act should not completely tie the hands of third party debt
collectors, and that certain practices were necessary to further the purposes of the industry.
Therefore, the Act allows some collection efforts albeit in a quelled manner.
3.1 Locatio".
Debt collectors may contact third parties to obtain "location infonnation" about the
debtor (e.g., residence address, phone number and place ofemployment).37 The debt collector must
identify himself, state that he is confinning or correcting location infonnation concerning the debtor,
and, only if expressly requested, identify his employer.38 Ho\vever, in doing so the debt collector
may not:
(a) state to the debtor that the consumer owes a debt;39
(b) contact the same debtor more than once unless requested to do so if
necessary to obtain more complete infonnation;40
(c) communicate by postcard;41or
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(d) use any language or symbol on any envelope or in the contents of any
communication through the mails or by telegram that indicates that the debt collector is in the debt
collection business or that the communication relates to collection of a debt.42
3.2 Allowed COlllnzUlz;eat;on.
Debt collectors may communicate with debtors, but the contact is limited. Written
contact must make the debt collector's intentions clear.43
Without the prior consent of the consumer or express pennission of a court of
competent jurisdiction, a debt collector's communications with the consumer in connection \vith
collection of a debt are restricted as follows: 44
(a) Phone calls or other communications may not occur at an unusual time
or place known or which should be known by the debt collector to be inconvenient to the debtor. 4S
It is presumed under the Act that contacts made after 8:00 a.m., and before 9:00 p.m. are reasonable
and pennissible.
(b) If the debtor is represented by an attorney with respect to the debt, the
debt collector must make reasonable effort to contact the attorney first, and may only contact the
debtor if the attorney fails to respond within a reasonable time or if the attorney pennits
communication directly with the debtor.46
(e) Efforts to contact the debtor at his or her place of employment are
prohibited if the debt collector knows or has reason to know that the employer prohibits the debtor
from receiving communications at work or ifthe debt collector is asked to refrain from such tactics.47
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3.3 Cessatioll ofCOllllllllllicatiol'.
The debt collector must cease communication with the consumer if the consumer
notifies the debt collector in writing that the debt is disputed, that the consumer refuses to pay the
debt, or that the consumer desires the debt collector to cease further communication.48 The debt
collector may, however:
(a) advise the consumer that the debt collector's efforts to collect are
terminated.49,
(b) notify the consumer that the debt collector or the creditor may utilize
specific remedies only if such remedies are intended or ordinarily used by such debt collector or
creditor;50 or
(c) where applicable, notify the consumer that the debt collector or creditor
intends to invoke a specified remedy.51
The Sixth Circuit has recently held, however, that noncoercive settlement offers can be made
after receipt ofwritten notice by the debtor to cease further communications.52 The court reasoned
that prohibiting such offers would be plainly at variance with the policy ofthe legislation as a \vhole.
"Allowing debt collectors to send such a letter is not only consistent with the Act but also may result
in resolution to litigation, saving all parties involved the needless cost and delay oflitigation."53
3.4 COIIservative Approacll Is Recolllillellded.
In Section 1692c of the Act, the use of terminology like "should be known," "has
reason to know," "readily ascertain," and "reasonable period" create ambiguities that may complicate
a debt collector's efforts to comply with the Act.54 Thus, a conservative approach in deciphering
these issues is the most prudent course to follow.
A·8
4. ACTIONS RESTRICTED (15 U.S.C. § 1692d).
The Act prohibits debt collectors from engaging in any type of behavior, the natural
consequence of which is harassment or abuse.55 Without limiting the broad coverage of this
statement, the following acts are considered violations of the Act:
4.1 Use or TI,reat o/Vio[ellce. The use or threat ofviolence or other criminal means
to hann the physical person, reputation or property of any person is prohibited;56
4.2 Obscelle or Pro/aile Lallgllage. The use of obscene or profane language or
language the nonnal consequence ofwhich is to abuse the hearer or reader;S7
4.3 P,lblicatiollo/COllsI11Izers. The publication ofa list ofconsumers \vho allegedly
refuse to pay debts, except to a consumer reporting agency or to certain persons to whom a consumer
reporting agency may divulge infonnation about the consumer;58
4.4 A dvertise111ellt. The advertisement for sale ofany debt to coerce payment of the
debt·59,
4.5 Telepllo11e COllversatiolls. Causing a telephone to ring or engaging any person
in telephone conversation repeatedly or continuously with intent to annoy, abuse or harass any
person at the called number;60 or
4.6 Caller's Idelltity. Except as provided in 15 U.S.C.A. § 1692b regarding
communications to collect a debt, the placement of telephone calls without meaningful disclosure
of the caller's identity.61
This is a nonexclusive list of unlawful collection tactics and it has been left to the
courts to detennine what additional behaviors constitute harassment or abuse on a case by case basis.
Moreover, although a creditor collecting its own debts is generally not subject to the Act, many state
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consumer protection acts also broadly prohibit abusive behavior similar to the Act.62 As such,
creditors collecting their own debts should also take note of their states' laws and comply
accordingly.
5. PROPER PROCEDURES To COLLECT UNDER THE ACT (15 U.S.C. § 1692g).
5.1 Writtell Notice.
The Act requires that the debt collector send a written notice to the consumer
containing the following infonnation within five days after the initial communication with the
consumer:
(a) a so-called "Mini-Miranda" statement that provides, "The debt collector
is attempting to collect a debt and any information obtained will be used for that purpose";63
(b) the amount of the debt and the name of the creditor to whom the debt is
o\ved;64
(c) a specified "Validation ofDebt Notice" that clearly indicates that, unless
the consumer, within thirty (30) days after receipt of the notice, disputes the validity ofthe debt, or
any portion thereof, the debt \vill be assumed to be valid by the debt collector;6S
(d) a statement that if the consumer notifies the debt collector in writing
within the thirty-day period that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, the debt collector will
obtain verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment against the consumer and a copy of such
verification or judgment will be mailed to the consumer by the debt collector;66 and
(e) a statement that upon the consumer's written request67 within the thirty-
day period, the debt collector will provide the consumer with the name and address of the original
creditor, if different from the current creditor.68
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This infonnation need not be provided ifcontained in the initial communication with
the consumer, or if the debt has been paid.69
5.2 Mi'ti-Mira"da War"i"K.
Although prior law required the Mini-Miranda warning on all communications with
the debtor, including communication during litigation,'O that requirement has been altered by an
amendment to 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(II). The Mini-Miranda warning must now be given on or during
all initial written or oral communications to the consumer except fonnal pleadings made in
connection with a legal proceeding.71 On all subsequent written or oral communications (except
fonnal pleadings made in connection with a legal action), the Mini-Miranda \vaming need not be
included but the communication must still disclose that the communication is from a debt collector.
5.3 Validatio't ofDebt Notice.
A debt collector should pay particular attention to preventing the Validation ofDebt
Notice from being overshadowed by other language in the communication so as to negate the
required effects of the notice. In considering this issue, the court may apply a "least sophisticated
consumer" test to detennine whether the consumer could be confused by the inclusion ofadditional
infonnation to the communication.
In these circumstances, additional infonnation can be easily viewed as contradicting
or complicating the Validation ofDebt Notice and thus negate its effect and cause a violation ofthe
Act. 72 The Seventh Circuit has held that, as a matter of law, demands for "immediate" or "urgent"
payment overshadow and contradict the Validation ofDebt Notice, unless there is a full explanation
of the relationship between the demand and the debtor's validation rights. 73
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Although the "least sophisticated consumer" test is applied in the majority of
circuits,74 in Gammon v. GC Services, 75 the Seventh Circuit objected to a standard based on the
"single most unsophisticated consumer who exists." The court preferred a standard that reflected
simply an "unsophisticated consumer," stating that an "unsophisticated consumer" standardprotects
the consumer who is uninfonned, naive or trusting, yet it admits an objective element of
reasonableness. Moreover, the Fifth Circuit has simply declined to recognize any difference between
the two standards and has refused to select between them. 76
While the Validation of Debt Notice provides for a thirty (30) day period for the debtor to
dispute the validity ofthe debt, the debt collector remains free to file suit within the thirty day (30)
period. In Sprouse v. City Credits Company77 the debt collector filed its complaint to collect the
debt prior to the expiration ofthe thirty (30) day validation period provided for under the Act. The
debtor argued the debt collector's actions violated the Act by attempting to require debtor's response
(in filing its answer to the complaint) to tIle validity of the debt before the expiration of the
validation period.
The Sprouse court held that the language in the summons accompanying the debt collector's
complaint requiring the debtor to file its answer within thirty (30) days did not'overshadow' the debt
collector's validation notice. The court reasoned it was entirely possible for the debtor to file their
answer within the thirty (30) day period and still file their objection to the validity of the debt as
provided for under the Act. In other words, a debt collector does not have to stop its collection
efforts to comply with the Act, instead, it must ensure that its efforts do not threaten a debtor's right
to dispute the validity of the debt.7s
A·12
5.4 Debt Collector M,ISt Provide Reqllested III/orlllatiol,.
Ifthe consumer notifies the collector in writing within the thirty-day period that any
portion of the debt is disputed, the debt collector must cease collection of the debt until the debt
collector obtains the required infonnation and mails it to the consumer.79
5.5 No Adll1issioll 0/Liability.
The failure of a consumer to dispute a debt does not constitute an admission of
liability in a court oflaw.80
6. RESPONSIBILITY OF COLLECTORS (15 U.S.C. § 1692e, § 1692f, § 1692i).
Debt collectors may not engage in any conduct which constitutes harassment or abuse. 81
Communications with consumers must confonn with the guidelines set out in the Act regarding
when and where the communications may take place, with whom the collector may communicate,
and the content of the communication.82
6.1 No UI,/air or U,ICOIlsc;ollable Met/lods.
The debt collector has a responsibility to avoid using unfair or unconscionable
methods to collect debts. 83 Without limiting the scope ofthis broad statement, the following conduct
is prohibited under the Act:
(a) the collection of any amount of money unless permitted by law or
authorized by the contract creating the debt;84
(b) acceptance by the debt collector from any person of a check or other
instrument for payment postdated by more than five days, unless the person is notified in \vriting of
the debt collector's intent to deposit the instrument not more than ten nor less than three days prior
to such deposit;8S
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(c) the solicitation by a debt collector of any postdated check or other
postdated payment instrument for the purpose of threatening or instituting criminal prosecution;86
(d) depositing or threatening to deposit any postdated check or other
instrument prior to the date on the instrument;87
(e) causing charges to be made to any person for communications (such as
collect telephone calls) by concealment of the true purpose of the communication;88
(j) taking or threatening to take any non-judicial action to effect dispossession
or disablement ofproperty if:
(1) there is no present right to possession of the property claimed as
collateral through an enforceable security interest;
(2) there is no present intention to take possession ofthe property; or
(3) the property is exempt by law from such dispossession or
disablement;89
(g) communicating \vith a consumer regarding a debt by postcard;90 and
(I,) using any language or symbol, other than the debt collector's address, on
any envelope when communicating with a consumer by use ofthe mails or by telegram, except that
a debt collector may use his business name if such name does not indicate that he is in the debt
collection business.91
A typical violation of the last prohibition occurs when a collection agency \vhose
name clearly implies its business, includes its name as well as its address on the envelope to the
debtor. As the courts rule on cases concerning different types ofconduct alleged to be violations of
the Act, the list will undoubtedly expand. For example, a debt collector's filing of a suit on a debt
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for which the statute of limitations had run, without first making reasonable inquiry as to whether
the statute was tolled, is an unfair practice under the Act.
The prohibition against collecting any amount that is not pennitted by la\v or
authorized by the agreement creating the debt canbe equally problematic. For example, in Charles,92
a plaintiffwrote a bad check for $17.93 to pay for a restaurant meal. When the bad check bounced,
the restaurant sent it to a third party debt collector. The debt collector demanded $42.93, then
referred the matter to the defendant attorneys. The attorneys claimed the plaintiffowed $317.93 and
offered to settle for $127.93. The Ninth Circuit ultimately held the plaintiffcould file a claim under
the Act stating that unless one of the foregoing exceptions applies the Act prohibits the collection
of anything greater than the amount of the debt, $17.93.93
6.2 False Represelltatioll Prollibited.
A'debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representations or
means in connection with the collection of any debt.94 Without limiting the general application of
the foregoing, the following conduct is a violation:
(a) the false representation or implication that the debt collector is vouched
for, bonded by, or affiliated with the United States or any state, including the use of any badge,
uniform, or facsimile thereof;95
(b) the false representation of:
(1) the character amount, or legal status of any debt; and
(2) any services rendered or compensation which may be lawfully
received by any debt collector for the collection of a debt;96
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(c) the false representation or implication that any individual is an attorney
or that any communication is from an attomey;97
(d) the representation or implication that nonpayment ofany debt will result
in the arrest or imprisonment ofany person or the seizure, garnishment, attachment, or sale of any
property or wages of any person unless such action is lawful and the debt collector or creditor
intends to take such action;98
(e) the threat to take any action that cannot legally be taken or that is not
intended to be taken;99
(j) the false representation or implication that a sale, referral, or other transfer
of any interest in a debt shall cause the consumer to:
(1) lose any claim or defense to payment of the debt; and
(2) become subject to any practice prohibited by this subchapter;100
(g) the false representation or implication that the consumer committed any
crime or other conduct in order to disgrace the consumer; 101
(II) communicating or threatening to communicate to any person credit
infonnation that is known or that should be known to be false, including the failure to communicate
that a disputed debt is disputed; 102
(i) the use or distribution ofany written communication which simulates or
is falsely represented to be a document authorized, issued or approved by any court, official or
agency of the United States or any state, or which creates a false impression as to its source,
authorization or approval; 103
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0) the use ofany false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt
to collect any debt or to obtain infonnation concerning a consumer; 104
(k) except as otherwise provided for communications to acquire location
infonnation under section 1692b of this title, the failure to disclose clearly in all communications
made to collect a debt or to obtain infonnation about a consumer, that the debt collector is attempting
to collect a debt and that any infonnation obtained will be used for that purpose; lOS
(I) the false representation or implication that accounts have been turned over
to innocent purchasers for value;106
(111) the false representation or implication that documents are legal process; 107
(11) the use of any business, company, or organization name other than the
true name of the debt collector's business, company, or organization;108
(0) the false representation or implication that documents are not legal
process fonns or do not require action by the consumer; 109 and
(P) the false representation or implication that a debt collector operates or is
employed by a consumer reporting agency.IIO
With regard to the prohibition relating to a "threat to take any legal action that cannot
be legally taken or that is not intended to be taken," the threats can be implicit as well as explicit.
Statements that a debt will be subject to "legal review" or "will be transferred to an attorney" have
been held to be implicit threats ofsuit. III A statement by an attorney that "all necessary actions" \vill
be taken is a threat ofsuit, "because to most consumers, the relevant distinction between a collection
agency and an attorney is the ability to sue."112
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In C. Lewis v. ACB Business Services, Inc., the Sixth Circuit held the use of a pseudonym
on a letter to a debtor does not violate the Act's prohibition against "the use of any false
representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt or to obtain infonnation
concerning a consumer."tt3 Ruling on policy grounds, the Court reasoned that aliases and office
names have long been utilized by collection agencies for the protection oftheir employees. As such,
the burden to an ethical debt collector that would result from prohibiting the use ofassigned aliases
by designated employees clearly outweighs ·any abstract benefit to a debtor that such a prohibition
might yield. 114
6.3 ForllllzlJllrisdictiolz.
The Act controls the forum in which suits may be filed against consumers by debt
collectors. An action to enforce an interest in real estate securing the debtor's obligation, usually a
foreclosure action, must be filed in the county where the real estate is located. liS This coincides \vith
the venue statute in Kentucky for this kind of action, KRS 452.400. Ho\vever, under the Act, any
other action filed by a debt collector on a debt against a consumer must be filed in either the county
\vhere the debtor signed the contract sued upon, or the county in which the debtor resides when the
action is filed. 116
This is somewhat more restrictive than KRS 452.480, which pennits an action to be
filed in the county of the debtor's residence or in a county where the debtor may be served, thus
pennitting suit to be filed against a person in the county where employed or where it is known the
debtor may be found ifdifferent from the debtor's residence. In situations where there is a conflict
between the Act and a state statute, the Act is controlling.
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7. CIVIL LIABILITY (15 U.S.C. § 1692k).
7.1 Civil Liability.
Under this section ofthe Act, a debt collector who violates the provisions ofthe Act
with respect to any person shall be liable to the aggrieved person for the sum of:
(a) any actual damage sustained by the person;ll7
(b) statutory damages not to exceed $1,000.00;118
(c) a reasonable attorney's fee as detennined by the court;119
(d) in the case of a class action:
(1) statutory damages not to exceed $ 1,000. 00 for each person
named as plaintiff; and/or
(2) an amount allowed by the court for all other class members not
to exceed the lesser of$500,000.00 or one percent (1 %) of the net worth of the defendant
debt collector; 120 and
(e) ifthe court finds that an action under this section was brought in bad faith
and for the purpose of harassment, it may award attorney fees to the defendant in an amount
reasonable in relation to the work expended and its costs of the action. 121
An award ofattorney fees to a successful debtor is generally considered by courts to
be mandatory.122 The fact that legal services were provided to the debtor for no charge does not bar
recovery of attorney fees, although it may be a factor used by the court to detennine the
"reasonableness" of the fee. However, a plaintiffwho is an attorney and proceeds pro se may not
recover attorney fees on his own behalf.
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Moreover, Attorney's fees arising from the prosecution of a case under the Act will not be
awarded for work performed by a plaintiffs attorney after the debtor makes an offer to confess
judgment for all amounts properly due at the time ofthe offer. 123 In Lee v. Thomas & Thomas, the
Sixth Circuit held that by proposing to confess judgment under the provisions of Rule 68 of the
Federal Rules ofCivil Procedure, the debtor capped its liability for attorney's fees under the Act at
the amount ofattorney's fees incurred by plaintiffs counsel at the time the confession ofjudgment
offer was made.
In Mumhy v. Equifax Check Services, Inc. 124, the United States District Court for
Connecticut went one step further ruling an offer by a debtor to pay the statutory $1,000 plus "all
reasonable fees and costs determined by the court" resulted in the case being dismissed as there \vas
no longer a constitutional "case or controversy" for the litigation to continue. The district court did
retain jurisdiction, however, to determine the appropriate amount of attorney's fees to be awarded.
7.2 A,IIOII,lt ofLiability.
In determining the amount of liability in any action, courts consider:
(a) in an action filed by an individual debtor, the frequency and persistence
of noncompliance by the debt collector, the nature of the violation and whether or not it \vas
intentional; 125 and
(b) in a class action, the factors set out in, Section 7.2(a) and also the financial
resources of the debt collector, the number of persons adversely affected and the extent to \vhich
noncompliance was intentional. 126
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With respect to class actions, most debt collectors deal with a large volume of\vork to which
they apply standardized procedures. Therefore, an error in the procedures causing a violation ofthe
Act will affect numerous debtors. This might present the requisites for a class action.
While the Act provides for damages in class actions, it does not otherwise provide specific
procedures for bringing class actions under the Act. Federal and state rules regarding class actions
will, however, apply. Courts interpreting class actions under the Act typically address the following:
(1) is legal counsel competent?; (2) were violations of the Act common to all class members?; (3)
does the number ofclass members make it impractical to join them as parties?; and (4) is the plaintiff
representative of the class?127
7.3 Ilztellt.
The courts generally will award the entire $1,000.00, or a large portion thereot: to a
successful consumer when the conduct of the debt collector is persistent, frequent and intentional.
The degree of culpability is relevant only as to the amount of the damages. A debt collector who
proves by a preponderance ofthe evidence that the violation was: (1) unintentional; (2) a bona fide
error; and (3) occurred despite the fact that the debt collector maintained procedures that were likely
to prevent such errors may not be found in violation under the Act. 128
The Sixth Circuit, however, treats the Act as a strict liability statute. As such, the Sixth
Circuit has held that the "bona fide" error defense only applies to clerical errors.129 If the matter
relates to an error in legal judgment, the "bona fide" error defense will not apply.130
7.4 Lillzitatiolls!.
Actions to enforce liability under the Act must be brought within one year from the
date the violation occurred, and shall be brought in any U. S. District Court or any state court of
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competent jurisdiction. 131 When the year begins to run depends on the nature of the violation and
the jurisdiction in which the violation occurs. 132
8. MISCELLANEOUS.
8.1 Ad",il,istrative Eliforcel"el,t (15 u.S.C. § 16921).
Compliance with the Act is enforced by the Federal Trade Commission, with certain
exceptions. 133Additionally, neither the Commission nor any other administrative agency may
promulgate any regulations with respect to collection of debts by debt collectors.
8.2 Relatioll to State La,vs (15 u.S.C. § 169211).
In states that have enacted their own laws to regulate debt collection practices, debt
collectors must also comply with state statutes except where they are inconsistent with any provision
of the Act.
8.3 Mliltiple Debts (15 u.S.C. § 1692/1).
In the case ofmultiple debts owed by one consumer, and in which the consumer sends
one payment to the debt collector with respect to the debts, the debt collector must apply the
payment in accordance with the debtor's directions. Ifnone are given, the debt collector may apply
the payment as it wishes but may not apply any part of the payment to a known disputed debt.
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Prejudgment collection and recovery remedies in Kentucky are known as
provisional remedies and found in Chapter 425 ofKentucky's Revised Statutes. The
Kentucky Legislature enacted the two remedies, writ ofpossession and attachment,
in 1976 as a legislative response to decisions of the United States Supreme Court
mandating due process rights for defendants in prejudgment seizure actions. The
attachment remedy retained its name, however, Kentucky's former order ofdelivery
became a writ of possession. Substantive amendments were enacted in 1984 to
enhance due process protections for defendants and to make the writ of possession
remedy more utilitarian for use in commercial cases.
I. WRIT OF POSSESSION
The writ ofpossession remedy primarily used by secured creditors when self-
help repossession cannot be obtained. Owens v. First Commonwealth Bank
o/Prestonsburg, Kentucky, 706 S.W.2d 414 (Ky. App. 1985).
A. When Filed. A motion for a writ of possession is proper only after
the complaint is filed and prior to final judgment. KRS 425.011(1).
The.post-judgment counterpart ofthe writ ofpossession is ajudgment
granting specific possession ofpersonal property. See, KRS 426.295
and 426.300 for post-judgment possessory remedies.
B. Compared With the Attachment. Both the writ ofpossession and
the attachment suit seek possession of specific personal property.
However, the writ ofpossession is directed toward property in which
the plaintiff holds an ownership or security interest, or which
constitutes the proceeds of property in which the plaintiff held a
security interest. (See, KRS 355.9-315 (Rev. 9) as to traceable
proceeds.) Attachment is a remedy for collection ofan ordinary debt,
proceeding by seizure of the debtor's assets under legal process.
Placer Coal, Inc. v. Rochdale Coal Services, 684 S.W.2d 25 (Ky.
App.1985).
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c. As Election ofRemedy. A plaintiffs decision to seek possession of
property through a writ, in most cases where the plaintiff holds a
security interest, does not constitute an election of remedies under
former KRS 355.9-501(1), and the case law thereunder, or under
Revised KRS 355.9-601. The plaintiff is entitled to pursue the
simultaneous remedies of possession of the collateral and the
monetary balance due on the obligation for which the property serves
as collateral. Ingersoll-Rand Financial Corporation v. Electro Coal,
Inc., 496 F.Supp. 1289 (E.D.Ky. 1980); Glamorgan Coal Corp. v.
Bowen, 742 F.Supp. 308 (W.D. Va. 1990); Bank One Akron, NA v.
Nobil, 610N.E.2d538 (Ohio App. 1992); Contra, Coonesv. Federal
Deposit Ins. Corp., 848 P.2d 783 (Wyo. 1993). A pending writ of
possession action does not prevent private action through self help
repossession pursuant to KRS 355.9-609. Headspath v. Mercedes-
Benz Credit Corp., 709 A2d. 717 (D.C. App. 1998), citing former 9-
503).
D. Procedure to Obtain Writ of Possession.
1. Motion and Affidavit or Verified Motion. The plaintiff
seeking a writ ofpossession may do so through a motion and
affidavit, or may proceed through a verified motion. The
affidavit or verified motion must meet the very specific
requirements of KRS 425.011(2). The following factual
evidence must be presented to the court under oath.
a. The plaintiff must show the basis of the claim which
entitles the plaintiff to possession of the property
sought through the writ. If the claim is made on the
basis of a written instrument, such as a security
agreement, a copy of the instrument should be
attached to the motion or affidavit and incorporated
by reference.
b. Factual evidence must show that the property sought
is wrongfully detained by the defendant, how the
defendant obtained possession of the property and,
according to the plaintiffs best knowledge, in-
formation and belief, why the defendant is detaining
the property. If the plaintiff obtained its security
interest after the debtor acquired the property, the only
alternative may be to state that the defendant owned
the property at the time the security interest was
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granted, and has held the property at all times since,
subject to the plaintiffs security interest. Often the
reason for detention is merely that the defendant
continues to have the beneficial use and enjoyment of
the property.
c. A particular description of the property to be seized
and a statement ofits value must be given to the court.
The value of the property as stated by the plaintiff is
the basis upon which the amount ofthe required bond
will be determined. The value should be sufficiently
high that it cannot be challenged in court but
sufficiently low that it does not result in an excessive
bond premium. A debtor's defense to a deficiency
judgment may be based on the plaintiffs statement of
value as opposed to the amount the property brought
at repossession sale. As originally enacted, the
requirement for a "particular description" was open to
interpretation. The 1984 amendments to Chapter 425,
however, adopted the description requirements ofthe
Uniform Commercial Code (KRS 355.9-108 (Rev. 9))
as the legal standard for the description under Chapter
425. Where multiple items of property are sought
through a writ of possession, the statement of value
may relate to the whole of the property and is not
required for each individual item.
d. Because it may be necessary for a sheriff to enter
private property in order to levy the writ of
possession, the plaintiffmust state the location of the
property. The plaintiff must provide sufficient facts
to show there is probable cause to believe the property
is located there.
e. The affidavit or verified motion must also contain the
statutorily required statement that" [T]he property has
not been taken for a tax assessment, or fine, pursuant
to a statute; or seized under an execution against the
property of the plaintiff, or if so seized, that it is by
statute exempt from such seizure. " KRS
425.011(2)(e).
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E. Due Process - Notice and Demand. Prior to various decisions ofthe
United States Supreme Court (discussed later in this section), it was
possible for a plaintiff to obtain a replevin in what was known as a
"claim and delivery" or "order ofdelivery" action without prior notice
to the defendant. Following the decision in Fuentes v. Shevin, 407
U.S. 67 (1972), and a decision specific as to the Kentucky statute,
Thompsonv. Kessee, 375 F.Supp. 195 (E.D. Ky. 1974), the Kentucky
Legislature enacted our current statutes on prejudgment remedies.
The primary thrust of these statutes is to provide a defendant with
meaningful notice and an opportunity to be heard before property is
taken through the power and force ofthe government. KRS 425.012.
1. Notice and Service. Notice must be timely. A writ may not
be issued less than seven (7) days nor more than sixty (60)
days after notice has been served on the defendant, or mailed
to the defendant. Notice and other required papers may be
served in the manner set out in CR 4, or personally served by
any person entitled to serve a subpoena, or may be sent to the
defendant's last known place of residence. CR 69.01.
The concept behind the less restrictive service requirements
for prejudgment remedies is to ensure that the defendant has
notice of the proceeding. Technical service requirements
might inhibit quick receipt of notice of a proceeding where
time is of the essence. There is no case law on whether final
judgment can be obtained through service under CR 69.01;
however, Phillips, Kentucky Practice (5th ed. 1995), asserts
that service under 69.01 can be the basis for a personal
judgment.
a. Service by Mail. Service by mail, certified or
registered, should not require personal service on the
defendant (restricted delivery) but only a return
receipt. This is different from the requirement under
CR 4. Although the writ notice and demand
requirements are statutory, and the Civil Rules for
mail service do not apply, a cautious practitioner will
follow CR 6.05 and allow three (3) additional days
before obtaining the writ when service is by mail
instead of personal service.
b. Documents Served. The defendant must be served
with a summons, notice and demand, complaint,
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motion and affidavit or verified motion, and a copy of
any instrument upon which the plaintiff bases its
claim for possession. KRS 425.012(1).
2. Required Contents of Notice.
a. Time for Response. The notice should open with a
statement that the debtor has seven (7) days from the
date of the demand to petition the court for a hearing
on the plaintiffs motion for a writ ofpossession. Or,
in cases where the writ is on the basis of a security
interest held by the plaintiff, seven (7) days to pay the
amount claimed in the plaintiffs complaint. The
defendant should additionally be informed that if a
hearing is not requested, or the amount claimed not
paid, the writ of possession will automatically be
issued.
b. Other Required Contents. The notice must identify
the court in which the lawsuit is pending, the grounds
on which the plaintiff bases its motion for a writ, the
date of the notice and demand, the amount of money
claimed due the plaintiff, and the name and address of
the plaintiff and its counsel.
c. Local Rules. The plaintiff s attorney should check
local rules of court for any additional specific
requirements of notice in prejudgment proceedings.
Jefferson Circuit Court Rule 509, for example, sets
out specific requirements for the notice and demand
in addition to the requirements of the statute. The
local rule in Jefferson County makes the notice more
meaningful by explaining how the defendant may
obtain a hearing.
F. Issuance of the Writ of Possession. If the defendant has not
requested a hearing, and the plaintiff or plaintiffs counsel has
tendered an affidavit evidencing compliance with the notice
requirements ofKRS 425.012, the statute provides that the clerk shall
issue the writ of possession. The Kentucky Attorney General has
affirmed the clerk's power to issue a writ of possession. See, 1980-
1981 Ky. Ope Atty. Gen. 2-174 The writ must meet the following
requirements.
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1. Direction of Writ to Sheriff. The writ must be directed to
the sheriff. KRS 425.046(1)(2). Assuming proper
jurisdiction and venue in the county where the action was
filed, the writ may be directed to any sheriff of the
Commonwealth. The sheriff should be directed to levy the
writ pursuant to KRS 425.091 and, ifthe property is found, to
retain the property in the custody ofthe sheriffuntil released
or sold pursuant to KRS ~25.101. A writ ofpossession may
also be levied by special bailiff. KRS 454.145. See, 1989 Ky.
Op. Atty. Gen. 2-417.
2. Description of Property. The property to be seized by the
sheriffmust be sufficiently identified that the sheriffmay levy
the writ without risk of taking property which is not subject
to the proceeding. KRS 425.046(1)(b).
3. Private Property to be Entered. If the sheriff is to enter
private property to levy the writ, that property must be
specifically identified. KRS 425.046(1)(c).
4. Notice of Defendant's Options. The writ must contain a
notice to the defendants that they have a right to post a bond
in order to obtain redelivery ofthe property pursuant to KRS
425.116, that they have a right to except to the sureties on the
plaintiffs bond, and that they have a right to seek an order
under KRS 425.081 to quash the writ and release the
property. KRS 425.046(2),(4).
G. Levy by Sheriff and Execution of Writ. Levy by the sheriff is
governed by KRS 425.091, KRS 425.096, and KRS 425.101. One
reason the writ ofpossession remedy is sometimes more useful than
its post-judgment equivalent is that a sheriff has the right to force
entry into private property to levy a writ ofpossession. The right to
force entry is not generally available to a sheriff executing a post-
judgment remedy. The precise procedure to be followed by the
sheriffprior to forcing entry is set out at KRS 425.091(3). The sheriff
may call upon other law enforcement officers for assistance in the
levy of the writ but is under a duty to retreat if a risk of death or
serious bodily harm may result from levy of the writ. Entry by
Sheriffto levy a writ ofpossession is not within the prohibition ofthe
Fourth or Fifth Amendments ofthe Constitution. GlvJLeasing Corp.
v. United States, 429 U.S. 338 (1977).
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1. Dwellings. If the property to be seized is a dwelling (most
often manufactured homes, but possibly boats, recreational
vehicles, or any other personal property in which a debtor
resides), the sheriffmust appoint a keeper ofthe property for
two days before taking further action. (Make sure a
manufactured home has not been converted to real property
under KRS 186A.297,a statute passed in the 2000
Legislature.) Once the defendant resident has been provided
with two days to vacate the premises, the sheriffmay remove
personal property not covered by the writ of possession and
then take possession of the property to be levied upon. KRS
425.091(2).
2. to-Day Waiting Period. In order to provide a defendant
with an opportunity to post a redelivery bond, except to the
plaintiffs surety, or demand a hearing on a motion to quash,
the sheriff must hold the property seized under a writ of
possession for ten (10) days. Ifno bond has been posted or a
hearing demanded, the sheriffmay deliver the property to the
plaintiff. KRS 425.101(1)(a).
3. Storage ofProperty. KRS 425.091 directs the sheriff, upon
levy, to remove the property to a place ofsafe keeping (except
in the case of property used as a dwelling). This provision
worked out very well when a sheriff was directed to levy
upon an automobile but was quite impractical, for example,
when the writ was directed to the entire inventory, equipment,
fixtures, and other personal property of an automobile
dealership. Additional problems arose in instances where
sheriffs were directed to levy upon delicate, expensive, and
sophisticated computer or scientific equipment, large jet
aircraft, etc. These problems were remedied through the 1984
amendments that offered sheriffs additional alternatives in the
levy of a writ ofpossession.
a. Immovable Property. If the sheriff determines that
it is impractical or impossible to move property levied
upon to a place of safe keeping or to store the
property, the sheriff may secure the property where
the levy has been made or surrender the property to
the plaintiff immediately upon seizure. KRS
425.101(3).
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b. Perishable Property. If the property levied upon is
perishable, or subject to immediate and substantial
deterioration or depreciation, or if the interest of the
parties are best served, a judicial officer (See, KRS
425.006(1)) may order that the property be sold and
the proceeds held by the court. KRS 425.101(2). The
author has previously used this remedy when levying
a writ of possession on the meat, dairy products,
vegetables and the other perishables in the inventory
of a grocery store.
4. Securing the Property. In order for a sheriff to secure
property in the place where it is found, the property must
consist of all, or substantially all, of the property within a
structure or area which is not used as a dwelling.
Additionally, the sheriff must have the consent of any third
party owner or occupant of the structure or area and must
provide the defendant with a reasonable right ofaccess to any
property not covered by the writ ofpossession. After levying
upon the property, the sheriff may secure the property by
locks or other means. KRS 425.101(3)(b). See, School
Supply Co., Inc. v. First National Bank of Louisville, 685
S.W.2d 200 (Ky. App. 1985).
5. Immediate Surrender to the Plaintiff. Ifthe property levied
upon is surrendered to the plaintiff, the plaintiff is required to
hold the property within the Commonwealth ofKentucky and
under all the same restrictions and requirements as are placed
upon the sheriff. KRS 425.101(3)(a).
6. Return of Writ. The sheriff must make a return on the writ
ofpossession no more than thirty (30) days after levy, and in
no event, even if levy has not been made, no more than sixty
(60) days following the date the writ is issued. KRS
425.106(1).
7. Delivery ofCopy ofWrit. At the time the writ ofpossession
is levied, the sheriffshould deliver to the person in possession
of the property, whether or not the defendant, a copy of the
writ ofpossession and a copy ofthe plaintiffs bond. If there
is no obvious party in possession or control ofthe property at
the time of the levy, and the defendant cannot be found, the
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sheriff is directed to leave a copy of the writ and bond at the
"usual place of abode of the person in possession of the
property." KRS 425.096(1)(2).
8. Levy in Another County. Although a writ may be directed
to any sheriffofthe Commonwealth, the sheriffwho initially
has been charged with levy of the writ may pursue property
which is subject to the writ into another county ifthe property
has been removed from the original county within twenty-
four (24) hours ofthe time the writ was placed in the sheriffs
hands. If time permits, the prudent practitioner should make
an ex parte motion pursuant to KRS 425.051 tq have the writ
of possession endorsed for service in another county. This
avoids the question of the precise time the property was
moved in relation to the time the writ was placed in the
sheriffshands.
H. Plaintiffs Bond. A plaintiff must post a bond in order to obtain a
writ of possession. Counsel representing plaintiff should make
locating a surety for the bond one of their first priorities. Many
surety companies are reluctant to write this type of bond and will
require extensive information concerning the client which frequently
must be reviewed by regional or home office personnel. When
practicing in an area where time is frequently important, the surety
requirement can often cause the greatest delay. KRS 425.111 and
KRS 425.116.
1. Amount. The plaintiffs bond must be a minimum of twice
the value of the property to be seized. If a hearing is held on
the plaintiffs motion for a writ of possession, one of the
determinations which must be made by the judicial officer is
the value ofthe property for bonding purposes. If sureties are
unavailable a cash bond may be posted with the court. KRS
425.111.
2. Required Statement. The plaintiffs bond must provide that
"[I]fthe plaintifffaiis to recover ajudgment in the action, the
plaintiff sllall return the property to the defendant, if return
thereof be ordered, and shall pay all costs that may be
awarded to the defendant and all damages referred to in
subsection (2), not exceeding the amount ofthe bond." KRS
425.111(1).
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3. Damages. Damages for which a plaintiffs bond may provide
reimbursement include "all damages sustained by the
defendant which are proximately caused by the operation of
the temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, if
any, the levy of the writ of possession, and the loss of
possession of the property pursuant to levy of the writ of
possession or in compliance with an order issued under KRS
425.036."
4. Sureties; Exception to Requirement. Sureties are not
required on the bond ofany "domestic bank, savings and loan
institution, or institution which is a member of the Farm
Credit System, as defined by 12 U.S.C. §2002." KRS
425.001.
I. Defendant's Bond. Any person who claims an interest in property
levied upon, or about to be levied upon, may either prevent the
taking, or regain possession pending final adjudication on the merits,
by filing a defendant's bond. See, Wahba v. Don Corlett Motors, 573
S.W.2d 357 (Ky. App. 1978). This bond, which also requires
sureties, may be in an amount equal to the plaintiffs bond or, ifthere
has been no judicial determination of the value of the property, the
value stated in the plaintiffs motion for a writ of possession. A
defendant's bond is determinative of the question of adequate
protection in the event of the defendant's bankruptcy. In Re Milo
Ridge Resort, 26 BR 277 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1982).
1. Amount. The statute setting out the requirements for a
defendant's bond, KRS 425.116, does not make sense when
read in conjunction with the statute for the plaintiffs bond,
KRS 425.111. A plaintiffs bond must be in an amount not
less than twice the value of the property, while the
defendant's bond may either equal the plaintiffs bond or be
only in an amount equal to the value of the property. There
is no logical reason for a defendant to elect to equal the
amount of the plaintiffs bond.
2. Required Statement; Damages. The defendant's bond must
provide that, "[I]f the plaintiff recovers judgment on the
action, the defendant shall pay all costs awarded to the
plaintiff and all damages that the plaintiff may sustain by
reason ofthe loss ofpossession ofthe property, not exceeding
the amount of the bonds." KRS 425.116(1).
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3. Notice of Bond. A defendant who posts a bond must mail a
copy to the levying officer and the plaintiff. At the time the
original bond is filed with the court it must be accompanied
by a certificate that the appropriate copies have been mailed.
The defendant's bond must also state the address to which a
copy of a notice of exception to sureties may be sent. KRS
425.116(2)(3).
J. Exceptions to Sureties. Both the plaintiff and defendant have the
right to object to each other's sureties. KRS 425.121. The defendant's
objection must be filed no later than ten (10) days after levy of the
writ. The plaintiffs exceptions must be taken no later than ten (10)
days after the defendant's bond is filed with the court. Any party
taking exceptions to the other's sureties must file the original
exception with the court and mail a copy to the levying officer and
the opposing party. The failure to timely take exception to the surety
on a bond constitutes a waiver of any further objection. KRS
425.121(3).
1. Appearance by Surety. When exception is taken to a surety,
the surety must appear before a judicial officer at the tinle
specified by the party taking exception andjustify their ability
to act as surety. Ifthe judicial officer determines that a surety
is not qualified, the statute directs that they vacate any writs
or orders entered under KRS Chapter 425 and the levying
officer must deliver all seized property to the prevailing party
at the hearing. KRS 425.121(5)(6).
2. Retention ofProperty by Sheriff. Counsel filing a notice of
exception to sureties should seek a court order directing the
sheriff to retain possession of the property levied upon until
such time as a hearing has been held on the notice of
exception.
K. Special Procedures Available Under the Writ of Possession
Statute.
1. Ex Parte Writs. A writ of possession may be obtained ex
parte under certain limited circumstances. KRS 425.076.
The plaintiffmust tender an affidavit which shows sufficient
facts to indicate that the plaintiff will be subject to great or
B ·11
irreparable injury ifissuance ofthe writ is delayed in order for
the notice requirements ofKRS 425.012 to be met.
a. Requirements. Specific statutory circumstances
which meet the required standard are:
(i) that there is a danger that the property sought
will be concealed, placed beyond the process
of the court, or substantially impaired in
value;
(ii) that the defendant obtained the property by
wrongfully taking it from the plaintiff(except
property taken by a defendant who was
entrusted with the property or originally
obtained by a defendant by false pretense or
embezzlement; the restrictions are such that
they almost require outright theft before this
subsection applies);
(iii) that the property is a credit card; or
(iv) there are other circumstances which in the
judgment of a judicial officer would result in
great or irreparable injury if the writ is
delayed for the notice period.
b. Other Requirements Not Waived. With the
exception ofthe required notice and demand, all other
aspects of the writ of possession statute must be met
by the plaintiffwho seeks a writ exparte. In addition
to service of the writ and bond as required by KRS
425.096, any defendant against whom a writ has been
entered ex parte must additionally be served with a
copy of the summons, complaint, motion, and any
affidavit tendered in support ofthe writ ofpossession
and ex parte procedure.
c. Limitations on Ex Parte Relief. Counsel should
only use the ex parte procedure in limited
circumstances which unquestionably justify this most
extraordinary of extraordinary remedies. Although
the United States Supreme Court, in a footnote to
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (described
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further at Sec. IV, Infra), referred to circumstances
where notice might not be appropriate, no decision
specifically approves the use of an ex parte
prejudgment remedy. See, Farmers Deposit Bank v.
Ripato, 760 S.W.2d 396 (Ky. 1988), Leibson,
concurring opinion. The basic allegation that the
property sought through the writ might be removed
from the Commonwealth is insufficient to justify
obtaining a writ ex parte unless an affidavit has been
provided to the court alleging specific facts
concerning the plaintiffs knowledge of imminent
removal. A defendant's threat to destroy property if
a writ action is filed would probably constitute
circumstances where the ex parte procedure would
properly be used.
(i) The majority opInIon of the Kentucky
Supreme Court, Farmers Deposit Bank v.
Ripato, 760 S.W.3d 396 (Ky. 1988),
specifically withheld a ruling on KRS
425.076, the statute allowing an ex parte writ
ofpossession. However, Justice Leibson, in a
concurring opinion, argued that Kentucky's
statute meets the due process requirements of
federal law.
(ii) To obtain an ex parte writ of possession
plaintiff must present an affidavit or verified
motion alleging actual knowledge of specific
facts that meet the test ofKRS 425.076. E.g.,
the defendant's threat to destroy the property
or an imminent and specific threat ofremoval
of the property from the jurisdiction if a writ
ofaction is filed. A general allegation that the
property may be moved is insufficient.
Issued by Judicial Officer. An ex parte writ of
possession should only be issued by a judicial officer
(as defined at KRS 425.006). KRS 425.076(1).
When no notice or opportunity to be heard is provided
to the defendant before a writ, it is necessary that the
plaintiffs pleadings be inspected for their legal
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sufficiency by a neutral magistrate. Mitchell v. Grant,
416 U.S. 600 (1974).
2. Indorsing a Writ of Possession. After the writ of
possession is issued, if the plaintiff determines that the
property sought to be seized is at a private place that is not
specified in the writ, through motion, and affidavit showing
probable cause, the writ can be indorsed for levy at a place
not specified in the writ. A copy of the indorsement should
be served with the writ ofpossession.
3. Order Transferring Possession. At the time a writ of
possession is entered, the plaintiff may also obtain an order
from the judicial officer which directs the defendant to
transfer possession ofthe property to the plaintiff. This order
is most useful in situations where the property sought cannot
be located but the defendant is available for service of the
order. KRS 425.041.
4. Procedure When the Property Sought Cannot be Located.
Ifthe levying officer's return indicates that the defendant has
disposed ofthe property, or has concealed the property so that
it cannot be found, the plaintiff may obtain an order of the
court compelling attendance ofthe defendant for examination
under oath concerning the property. The contempt powers of
the court may specifically be invoked against uncooperative
defendants. KRS 425.106(2).
L. Defending Writ of Possession Actions.
1. Strict compliance with Statutes. The seizure of property
prior to entry ofa final judgment constitutes an extraordinary
procedure. This requires strict compliance with all of the
statutory requirements to obtain the writ ofpossession. Duo-
Therm v. Sheergrain, 504 S.W.2d 689 (Ky. 1974);
Weisenberger v. Corcoran, 275 Ky. 322, 121 S.W.2d 712
(1938). The strict compliance standard does not apply to the
third remedy, garnishment, authorized by Chapter 425. PNC
Securities Corp. v. Finanz-UND GMBH-Liedgens, 1996 WL
665574 (6th Cir. 1996).
2. Request for Hearing. Ifthe plaintiffs pleadings are in order
but defendant's counsel believes questions of fact or law
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exist, a request for a hearing should immediately be filed with
the court and certified to plaintiffs counsel. The hearing
procedure is set out in KRS 425.031. Each party may present
witnesses, cross-examine adverse witnesses, and compel the
attendance ofwitnesses by subpoena.
3. Standard ofProof. The plaintiffs standard ofproofis found
atKRS 425.036. Under that section, a plaintiffmust establish
the "probable validity of his claim to possession." The
judicial officer must also determine the value ofthe property,
the sufficiency of the plaintiffs bond, and whether probable
cause exists for allowing a sheriff to enter private property.
4. Effect of Failure to Prevent Writ. A defendant who
unsuccessfully opposes entry of a writ of possession has not
been prejudiced in hislher case on the merits. KRS 425.061
provides that the determinations of the judicial officer at a
hearing on a motion for writ ofpossession may not be given
in evidence at trial on the merits and have no effect on any
issues other than the proceedings under Chapter 425.
5. Lack of Notice; Motions to Quash. In cases where a
defendant has not received notice ofthe plaintiffs motion for
a writ, and was unaware ofthe proceedings until the property
was taken, a motion to quash is the remedy. KRS 425.081.
A motion to quash gives the defendant a second chance for a
hearing. When a motion to quash has been made, a hearing
is held pursuant to KRS 425.031, the same statute governing
hearings prior to the writ having been issued. However, a
mere motion to quash is insufficient to prevent delivery of
property to the plaintiff. Defense counsel must make a
motion and obtain an order staying delivery. KRS
425.081(2).
6. Bond. The defendant may take exception to sureties on the
plaintiffs bond. KRS 425.121.
7. Venue. Any action which seeks possession of specific
personal property, when coupled with a demand for damages,
is a transitory action and must be filed where personal service
may be obtained. Gover v. Wheeler, 206 Ky. 734, 178
S.W.2d 404 (Ky. 1944). Ifthe action is filed only against the
property, for the purpose of gaining possession, it may be
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brought in rem. If the action is filed in a county where
personal service may be obtained, the writ may be directed to
any county in Kentucky where the property is located. KRS
425.056(3).
II. TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDERS UNDER CHAPTER 425
A Temporary restraining order (TRO) often fills the gap which exists
between a noticed motion for a writ ofpossession and proceeding ex parte.
At the time a motion for writ of possession is filed, the plaintiff may also
apply for a TRO. When a TRO is sought in conjunction with a writ of
possession it is pursuant to a statutory process, rather than the Civil Rules.
For this reason, there is a disagreement between judges, commentators, and
practitioners as to whether or not the notice requirements of CR 65.03 are
applicable. KRS 425.066 and KRS 425.086.
A. Use. This remedy is frequently used in situations where a third party
has temporary possession or control of the collateral which may
become unavailable for levy iftransferred back to the defendant. An
example is an automobile temporarily in possession of a dealer for
repairs and which is the subject of a writ of possession proceeding
brought by an unpaid secured party.
B. Farm Products and Inventory. If the property sought by the writ
of possession action is either a farm product (KRS 355.9-
102(34)(Rev. 9)), or inventory (KRS 355.9-102(48)(Rev. 9)), the
TRO may not prohibit transfer ofthe property in the ordinary course
of the defendant's business, however, the TRO may impose
restrictions on disposition of the proceeds of farm products and
inventory. KRS 425.071(a).
c. Restrictions on Ordinary Property. Other prohibitions that may be
obtained by a temporary restraining order include prohibiting the
defendant from: transferring any interest in the property by sale,
pledge, or grant of security interest, or otherwise disposing of or
encumbering the property; concealing or otherwise removing the
property in such a manner as to make it less available to seizure by
levying officer; and impairing the value ofthe property either by acts
of destruction or by failure to care for the property in a reasonable
manner. KRS 425.071(a), (b), and (c).
D. Required Statement. In order to obtain a TRO, pending issuance of
the writ of possession, the plaintiff must show by affidavit "[T]hat
•. "t ": !~...
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there is an immediate danger that the property claimed may become
unavailable by reason ofbeing transferred, concealed, or removed or
may become substantially impaired in value." KRS 425.066(2).
E. Scope of Order. TROs may prohibit the transfer of an interest in
property by sale, pledge, or grant ofsecurity interest, encumbrance of
property, concealment or removal of property w4ich makes it less
available to a levying officer, or impairment ofthe value ofproperty
by either act of destruction or failure to care for the property. KRS
425.071./
F. TRO Following Request for Ex Parte Writ. The plaintiff who
unsuccessfully seeks an ex parte writ of possession may move the
court for a TRO under KRS 425.086 in lieu ofthe exparte procedure.
G. Hearings. If a hearing is requested on the plaintiffs motion for a
writ of possession, the judicial officer must either dissolve the
temporary restraining order or enter a preliminary injunction based on
the court's decision on the merits of the plaintiffs motion. If a
preliminary injunction is entered it is to cover the period between
entry of the writ of possession and levy by the sheriff.
III. ATTACHMENTS
A. Generally. Attachments are governed by KRS 425.301 et seq. An
attachment is a remedy available at the commencement of an action
for the recovery of money. It is similar in nature to the writ of
possession but is the proper remedy for seizure ofproperty in which
the plaintiff does not hold a security or ownership interest. An
attachment is a remedy for collection of an ordinary debt, when the
creditor proceeds by seizure ofdebtor's personal property assets under
legal process. Placer Coal, Inc. v. Rhondale Coal Services Co., Inc.,
684 S.W.2d 25 (Ky. App. 1984). The purpose ofthe attachment is to
serve as security for satisfaction of a final judgment. Attachment is
also available prior to the time a debt or liability may be due when an
equitable action for inderimity is brought against a debtor, a principal
by a surety, or one joint debtor against another. KRS 425.306.
1. Variety of Attachment Remedies. The various remedies
available under the umbrella term "attachment" include
garnishments of bank accounts and wages, liens against real
estate, and the seizure of personal property. AGe Form 106
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(Rev. 11/99), available from court clerks and the print shop of
the Administrative Office ofthe clerk, is a general attachment
against all ofa defendant's property including property in the
hands ofa debtor or in the possession of a third party. The
latter type of attachment is similar to a garnishment but is
prejudgment in nature.
2. Proper Defendants. Attachment is not available to every
plaintiff. If the motion for attachment is brought pursuant to
KRS 425.301 in an action for recovery of money, a motion
for attachment is proper against:
(a) foreign corporations and nonresidents of Kentucky;
(b) residents who have been absent from Kentucky for
four months, or
Persons who:
(c) have departed from Kentucky with the intent to
defraud their creditors;
(d) have left the county oftheir residence to avoid service
of a summons;
(e) have concealed themselves so that a summons cannot
be served on them;
(f) are about to remove, or have removed their property,
or a material part thereof, out of Kentucky, not
leaving eno~gh within the state to satisfy the
plaintiffs claims, or the claims of the defendant's
other creditors;
(g) have sold, conveyed or otherwise disposed of their
property or permitted it to be sold, with the fraudulent
intent to cheat, hinder or delay their creditors; or
(h) are about to sell, conveyor otherwise dispose of their
property with the fraudulent intent to cheat, hinder or
delay their creditors.
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3. Attachment to Secure Liquidated Debt. If the sum of
money is due upon a contract, judgment or award, proper
defendants additionally include those who do not have
property in this state subject to execution, or not enough
property to satisfy the plaintiffs demand, and the collection
or demand will be endangered by a delay in obtaining
judgment.
4. Unmatured Obligations. If the attachment is sought
pursuant to KRS 425.306, on the basis of a debt or liability
upon a contract which is not yet due or mature, it is proper if:
(a) the defendant(s) is or are about to depart from
Kentucky, and, with intent to defraud their creditors,
have concealed or removed from Kentucky their
property, or so much of their property that after
judgment there would be an insufficient amount
available for execution; or
(b) the defendant falls within any of the groups set forth
in 2., supra.
5. Specificity ofPleadings. When seeking an attachment do not
take a shotgun approach in listing the statutory criteria which
entitled you to an attachment. You should list specific
grounds and be prepared to show facts to back up those
grounds. Universal C.I T. Credit Corp. v. Collett, 256
S.W.2d 35 (Ky. 1953).
B. Due Process Requirements-Notice and Demand. The notice
requirements of KRS 425.301(3) associated with a motion for a
prejudgment attachment are nearly identical to those in KRS 425.012,
the writ of possession statute. The contents of the required notice
differ, but the procedural requirements are identical.
1. Notice. The notice given the defendant against whom an
attachment is sought must be timely. The attachment may not
be issued less than seven (7) days nor more than sixty (60)
days after the notice .has been served on the defendant, or
mailed to the defendant. Service of the notice and other
required papers may be accomplished in the manner set out in
CR 4, or personally served by any person entitled to serve a
subpoena, or may be sent to the defendant by registered or
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certified mail, return receipt requested, to the defendant's last
known place of residence. See, CR 69.01. As noted in the
notice and demand section of the discussion on writs of
possession, the primary thrust ofthe statutory and Civil Rules
requirements for service in attachment actions is to insure that
the defendant has notice of the proceeding. The time in
which the defendant must respond in order to keep the
attachment from being issued is very short. Hence, the
drafters of the statute deemed making the notice available to
the defendant more important than insuring that it is delivered
personally to the defendant.
a. Service by Mail. If service is made by certified or
registered mail, it should not be sent restricted
delivery. This varies from the mail requirements of
CR 4 and must often be explained to court personnel.
Although the statute requires only a minimum of
seven (7) days notice, a cautious practitioner who
serves by mail will follow CR 6.05 and not seek the
attachment until ten (10) days have run. The notice
must be served simultaneously with a copy of the
complaint, the motion for attachment, a summons, and
any affidavit in support of the motion.
b. Local Rules. The Jefferson Circuit Court has enacted
local rule 509 concerning all motions for prejudgment
remedies under KRS Chapter 425. Additional notice
requirements, designed to make the notice more
meaningful to the average person, are required.
Specific directions on how to obtain a hearing from
the court must be provided in notices and demands
used in Jefferson County. Practitioners in other
circuits should check their local rules for any similar
requirements.
2. Required contents of the Notice and Demand.
a. Required Statement. The notice and demand must
contain an initial statement to the effect that the
defendant has seven (7) days in which to request a
hearing from the court, or in which to pay the
plaintiff s claim in full, and that if a hearing is not
requested or the claim paid, the plaintiff will seek an
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order which will subject the defendant's property to
payment of the claim. If the notice and demand are
being sent by mail the plaintiff must consider the
effect of CR 6.05.
b. Other Requirements. The notice and demand must
identify the court in which the suit has been filed, the
grounds on which the plaintiff bases the motion for
attachment, the date the demand is served or mailed,
the amount of the plaintiffs claim, and the name and
address of the plaintiff and counsel.
c. Motion for Attachment. Under KRS 425.307, the following must
be contained in the motion for attachment, which shall be executed
under oath:
(a) the nature of the plaintiffs claim;
(b) that it is just;
(c) the sum which the plaintiff believes it ought to
recover; and
(d) the existence of any of the enumerated grounds for
attachment set out in KRS 425.301 or 425.306.
D. Issuance of the Attachment. KRS 427.307(3) states that the order
of attachment "shall" be issued by the clerk upon compliance with
KRS 425.301(3). This statute sets out the notice and service
requirements and also requires an affidavit of the plaintiff, or
plaintiffs attorney, evidencing compliance with the notice, service,
and pleading requirements. The Kentucky Attorney General
discussed the clerk's authority to issue an order of attachment at
1980-1981 Ky. Ope Atty. Gen. 2-174.
E. Attachment Bonds. A plaintiffis required to post a bond under KRS
425.309 in a minimum amount ofdouble the plaintiffs claim before
an attachment will be issued.
1. Compared to Bond Requirements in Writ Actions. The
bond requirement for attachment suits is different from that in
writ ofpossession actions. For attachment suits, the amount
ofthe bond is based on the plaintiffs claim, as opposed to the
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value of the property to be attached. This works well in
situations where the property is worth more than the debt to
be collected but poses problems for the plaintiffwith a large
claim and only limited assets of the defendant to attach. An
argument can be made that the bond amount should be twice
the plaintiffs claim which is in the nature ofattachment (the
value of the property to be attached) as opposed to the total
amount of the lawsuit brought against the defendant.
2. Defendant's Bonds. Prior to the 1984 statutory amendments,
there were no provisions for a defendant's bond. Now, upon
posting of a bond equal to the plaintiffs claim, including
court costs and attorney's fees, an attachment entered against
a defendant's property may be dissolved by the posting of a
bond. KRS 425.309(2).
3. No "Magic Words". The attachment bond statute does not
have a requirement for specific language as is found in the
writ statute. However, the language ofthe writ ofpossession
statute can serve as a model.
4. Sureties and Exceptions. Exceptions to the sureties on both
plaintiffs and defendant's attachment bonds are made in
accordance with the writ of possession surety exception
statute. KRS 425.121. Just as in the writ of possession
statute, no surety is required on the bond of a plaintiff that is
a domestic bank, savings and loan institution, or institution
which is a member ofthe Farm Credit System (as defined by
KRS 12 USC § 2002). KRS 425.001.
F. Ex Parte Relief. An order ofattachment is available to a plaintiffex
parte under KRS 425.308. If the plaintiffmeets the requirements of
KRS 425.307, and additionally demonstrates that great or irreparable
injury will result if issuance of the attachment is delayed for the
notice period, the order for attachment may be issued without notice
to the defendant. As with the ex parte provisions of the writ of
possession statute, practitioners are urged to use extreme caution and
carefully examine the facts upon which a client bases a request for ex
parte relief. KRS 425.306(2) implies that when an attachment is
sought as part of an equitable action for indemnity it may be had
without notice ifcertain specific grounds appear in the petition. This
section has not been tested before our state's appellate courts. A
conservative practitioner would follow the requirements of KRS
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425.308 before seeking the ex parte order. (See, discussion of
exparte writs of possession, supra.)
G. Venue. Attachment actions may be brought as in rem, quasi in rem,
or in personam actions. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
See, 66 Ky. L.J. 1, "Substantive Due Process Controls of Quasi In
Rem Jurisdiction." Although the attachment suit may be brought
against property it is necessary to plead the case in the proper forum,
as the cause ofaction itselfmay be considered transitory. Also, See,
Citizens Bank and Trust Company of Paducah v. Coillins, 762
S.W.2d 411 (Ky. 1989) where our Supreme Court held that the basis
for jurisdiction over a thing must be sufficient to justify jurisdiction
over the interests of a person in the thing.
H. Attachment Against Real Estate. Frequently a debtor who has left
the state retains ownership of real estate within the Commonwealth.
This real estate may be reached by the remedy of attachment. In
order to prevent transfer of the real estate, the plaintiffs attorney
must record notice of the attachment in the real estate records of the
county clerk. The priority ofthe attachment lien is established by the
date of levy. KRS 426.383.
I. Defending the Attachment Suit. The statutory framework of the
attachment suit section of Chapter 425 is much less precise than that
for writs ofpossession. No section specifically sets out the nature of
the hearing afforded a defendant who petitions for a hearing. Most
judges and practitioners refer to KRS 425.031, concerning conduct of
the hearing, and 425.036 (both in the writ ofpossession section), for
the burden ofproof standard.
1. Motions to Release Attachments. The 1984 amendments to
Chapter 425 included KRS 425.302 which allows a defendant
against whom an order ofattachment has been levied to move
that the attachment be released. A defendant making a
motion under this statute is entitled to an immediate hearing.
2. Strict Compliance. The plaintiffs pleadings should be
carefully examined to insure they have met the technical
requirements ofthe statute since the rule ofstrict compliance
will apply. Duo-Therm, 405 S.W.2d 689.
3. Defendant's Bonds. The 1984 amendments also resulted in
the creationofKRS 425.308(2), the defendant's bond statute.
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IV. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS IN PREJUDGMENT
REMEDY PRACTICE.
In Kentucky, the writ of possession was formerly known as an order of
delivery, or replevin. The name of the remedy was changed -with the
enactment of the current statute in 1976. The name of the remedy of
attachment has not changed; however, the statutory method to obtain the
remedy was also changed in 1976. This was the legislature's response to the
various United States Supreme Court cases which applied the constitutional
concepts of due process to several remedies obtained by private parties
through the power of the courts. The significant decisions, which should be
reviewed by any practitioner who either brings or defends actions where a
prejudgment remedy are sought, are:
1. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corporation, 395 U.S. 337
(1969). This case was the first decision to apply due process
requirements to civil remedies. The decision was limited in
scope and simply held that wages were a special class of
property that could not be garnisheed without giving the
defendant a notice and opportunity to be heard.
2. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972). This is perhaps the
most famous of the line of cases concerning a defendant's
notice and opportunity to be heard before the imposition ofa
prejudgment remedy. This decision extended the due process
requirements first given to wages to all forms of personal
property.
3. Mitchell v. Grant, 416 U.S. 600 (1974). This decision was a
slight retreat from Fuentes in that the defendant was not given
notice and opportunity to be heard before the seizure of
personal property. The Court found that a pre-levy inspection
of pleadings by a neutral magistrate combined with an
immediate right to a hearing after the seizure met the due
process requirements.
4. North Georgia Finishing v. Di-Chem, 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
Here the Court specifically extended due process protection,
and the notice and opportunity to be heard, from strictly
consumer to corporate defendants.
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5. Connecticutv. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1 (1991). The Supreme Court
overturned a Connecticut statute that allowed the ex parte
attachment of real estate to secure an unliquidated tort claim
when the defendant did not have an opportunity for hearing
before the attachment. The primary point on which plaintiffs
may distinguish the case is the nature of the claim for which
they seek an attachment. However, the Connecticut statute
did include due process protection that a judge find probable
cause to believe that judgment would be rendered in favor of
the plaintiff.
a. The Ninth Circuit similarly found that a Washington
statute allowing the prejudgment attachment of real
property in a homeowner's suit for breach of a
builder's construction contract, without notice and an
opportunity to be heard, violated the builders right to
due process. The court ruled that although the state
statute required a bond in the amount sought by the
plaintiff, and provided for an expedited post-seizure
hearing, that there remained a high risk of improper
deprivation of property and denial of due process..
Tri-State Development, Ltd v. Johnston, 160 F.3d 528
(9th Cir. 1998).
6. McLaughlin v. Weathers, 170 F.3d 577 (6th Cir. 1999). The
Sixth Circuit upheld a Tennessee attachment process that did
not afford the defendant a pre-deprivation hearing, but where
the statute required supporting documentation, affidavits,
adequate bond, required an appearance before a judge to
establish that the statutory requirements were met, and offered
the defendant an opportunity for an immediate post-seizure
hearing.
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The purpose of this outline is to familiarize the reader with the legal and practical
considerations involved in filing and litigating the common collection case. Special
emphasis is given to consumer, collection cases, given the impact that the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) may have the litigation of the suit. FDCPA is dealt
with separately in these materials by Chip Bowles. Special issues concerning
commercial collection cases are dealt with by Buck Lloyd. For a more in depth look at
the area of Collections Law, see generally Kentucky Collections, by William R.
Mapother, published by the Westlaw group.
I. Preparing to file suit
A. Initial evaluation of the case. Go through every scrap ofpaper in the file
and look for the following
1. Are you within the applicable statute of limitations?
a. General contract in writing - 15 years (KRS 413.090(2))
b. Contract for the sale of goods - 4 years (KRS 355.2-725(1)
c. Limitations ofActions are found generally at KRS Ch. 413
2. Are there any reasons that you should not file the suit?
a. You are outside the statute of limitations
b. One or more of the debtors have filed bankruptcy
(1) There is a co-debtor stay in Chapter 13 bankruptcies
(a) if one of two parties to a contract have filed Ch.
13 bankruptcy, you are stayed from collecting
against the non-bankrupt signer
(b) this stay can be terminated (See Chapter on
Bankruptcy Fundamentals by Cathy Pike, infra)
(c) ifyou get the Ch. 13 codebtor stay terminated,
you need to file suit for the entire debt against
the non-bankrupt cosigner, but you can only
collect the amounts that you are not paid
(including interest on the entire debt) through
the bankruptcy court
(d) ifyou file <suit for only what you are not begin
paid through the bankruptcy court and get a
judglnent, then the Chapter 13 bankruptcy is
e-l
dismissed, you have then limited what you can
collect from the co-signer and may have created
(e) a defense for the fonner bankrupt (See KRS 3-
605 [Discharge of Indorsers and Accomodation
Makers] (but see, subsection (9) where this can
be waived) and KRS 412.110
(f) there is no co-debtor stay in a Chapter 7 or
Chapter 11 proceeding.
c. Lack of essential documentation
(1 ) No notice of sale in an automobile collection case
(2) Incomplete or illegible copy of the note
3. Is the debtor collectable?
a. Are they employed
(1) even if employed is the debtor's take home pay more
than the exelnption amount allowed in Kentucky
(2) This alTIOunt is 30 times the federal minimum hou
wage or 25% oftheir earnings, whichever is less -
KRS 427.010 and AOC Form 150. See also, 15 USC
§1673
b. If the debtor is not employed, are there other assets from
which to collect?
(1) Bank accounts
(2) Accounts receivable (including rents, franchises,
leases, etc.)
(3) Real property on which you can impress a lien
4. Has the debtor passed away?
a. If so, is it too late to file a claim in the decedent's estate?
b. You have six (6) months from the appointlnent of an
administrator or executor, or ifno personal representative is
appointed, two (2) years from the decedent's death to file
your claim in the estate - KRS 396.011(1)
c. Ifyou file your claim after this date, your claim will be barred
5. Is there any indication that the debtor has retained counsel? If so,
see the next section on considerations under the FDCPA, ~ I(B)(4),
infra.
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B. Sending an initial demand and Validation Notice
1. You must send the debtor a Validation Notice with your first
communication to the debtor, or within five (5) days after that initial
communication, ifyou are considered a "debt collector"
a. It applies to any communication, even if that communication
is oral
(1) if the communication is in writing, the Validation
Notice can be included with that letter
(2) if the communication is oral, then you must give the
Validation then, or within five (5) days thereafter. I
suggest that if the first comlnunication is oral, that you
send a written Validation Notice to the debtor so there
can be no question that you met your obligation under
the statute
b. The Act does not apply to creditors trying to collect its own
debt in its own name.
c. It applies only to the collection of consumer debts
d. It does not apply to an attorney that regularly collects debts
for another
(1) "regularly" is not a defined term
(2) there are some general guidelines on what constitutes
"regularly", but to be safe, ifyou are collecting a
consumer debt for another, abide by the FDCPA.
e. The requirements ofwhat needs to be in the Validation
Notice can be found in 15 USC §1692g(a) and is covered in
Chip Bowles outline on this subject
2. You are also required to include the "mini-Miranda" warnings with
every communication with the debtor, including the initial
communication. It should read: "This communication is from a debt
collector and any information received will be used for that
purpose."
3. The text of the letter should be very simple so your letter does not
overshadow the debtor's ability to contest the debt. Again, see Chip
Bowles section on the FDCPA for more detail.
4. Ifyou have information from your client that the debtor has counsel,
you must communicate through that attorney, not with the debtor,
directly. To do so would not only be a breech ofyour professional
obligations, but is an independent violation of the FDCPA.
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II. Filing suit
A. When to file suit
1. There are two schools of thought on this:
a. Do not file suit until you have mailed a Validation Notice to
the debtor with your initial commuincation
(1) any communication from a debt collector cannot
"overshadow" the debtor's rights to collect the debt
(2) filing suit within this thirty (30) day validation period
could be problematic in jurisdictions whose answer
periods are less than thirty (30) days [like Kentucky]
(a) the argument is that the debtor gets a letter from
you on day one telling hiln that he has thirty
(30) days to contest the debt
(b) thereafter, he gets a summons that says he only
has twenty (20) days to answer the cOlnplaint
(c) SOlne courts have held that the summons
overshadows the letter, and confuses the debtor,
thus a violation of the FDCPA.
(3) There are two solutions:
(a) do not file suit within the thirty (30) validation
period
(b) do not file suit for ten (10) days after the
Validation Notice has been sent to the debtor
b. The other school of thought says that filing suit within the
thirty (30) day validation period is permissable.
(1) there in noting in the FDCPA that prohibits you from
suing within the thirty (30) days.
(2) even the "lease sophisticated debtor" will understand
the difference between contesting the debt and filing
an answer to a complaint. The contest of the debt
could be the filing of an answer. The two remedies are
not mutually exclusive
(3) Case law supports this premise. See, Sprouse v City
Credits Company, 126 F.Supp. 2d 1083 (W.D. Ohio,
2000)
B. Whom to sue - While this seems like a simple question, consider the
following
1. What if the purchases were by a wife for "necessaries" as defined at
KRS 404.040. Should consideration be given to suing the husband?
2. What if there are co-obligors? Has your client received a
communication pursuant to KRS 412.110 lnandating that you seek
judgment against the other obligor, first?
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a. Have you met the deadlines under that statute?
b. Does your client's contract waive that right?
c. Has the debtor filed bankruptcy?
(1) was you debt listed?
(2) if so, has the debtor received a discharge?
(3) if tlley have not received a discharge, are there reasons
that your client's debt should not be discharged? See
generally, the discussion of this topic in Cathy Pike's
outline
(4) has there discharge been denied?
(5) if it is a Chapter 13 bankruptcy, do you still have time
to file a proof of claim?
(6) if it is a Chapter 13 bankruptcy, and you have a co-
signer, has the co-signer stay been tenninated?
d. Has the debtor died?
(1) if so, is there an estate?
(2) ifnot, should you consider having an estate opened?
(3) if there is an estate, have you timely filed your claim
with the estate?
(4) ifyour claim has not been paid by the estate, but
should have, do you need to file a claim against the
executor or administrator?
(5) do you need to substitute the executor or adtninistrator
as a party-defendant in your action?
C. Where to sue - the interaction of the FDCPA with state venue provisions
1. Which court Gurisdiction)
a. If the debt is over $4,000 (not including interest and court
costs) then you file in circuit court
b. If the debt is $4,000 or less (not including interest and court
costs), then you file in district court
2. Which county (venue)
a. The FDCPA has severely restricted where consumer cases
can be filed.
b. KRS Chapter 452 is filled with statutes governing where
certain types of action can be filed.
c. To the extent there was no statute that dealt with your
situation, you could use the catch-all, transitory action statute
found at KRS 452.480
d. The "multiple defendant" rule found in that statute allowed
you to file suit in any county where one of several defendants
to an action could be served with summons.
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e. FDCPA has restricted that statute significantly. Since it is a
federal statute, it trulnps the state statute, but only as it deals
with consumer transactions.
f. Venue is found in FDCPA at 15 USC §1692n.
(1) FDCPA allows you to sue the consumer:
(a) where the contract was signed, or
(b) where the debtor resides
(2) Kentucky statutes must be read together with the
Federal statute. Only the more liberal provisions of
the state statute would be overruled by the federal
statute, but the federal statute could not create venue in
a state court action where none existed before.
(a) Kentucky venue statutes did not allow you to
sue a consumer simply because a contract was
signed there.
(b) the federal statute overrules the state "multiple
defendant" rule
(c) the end result is that you can sue the
consumer debtor only in the county where he
or she resides.
(d) if the joint debtors live in different counties,
then you have to file two suits, unless
i) you file suit in the county where all the
debtors signed the contract, and
ii) where at least one ofthe debtors resides,
and
iii) you serve that debtor before any other
debtor
iv) venue is correct because you have
satisfied the most restrictive aspects of
both statutes.
D. Amount for which to sue
1. You cannot sue for more than you are entitled.
2. To do so would be a violation ofFDCPA.
3. Make sure the principal is properly calculated
a. You should make sure that you are suing for a net claim
b. If there is interest that should have been rebated or credits
that have not yet been applied, you need to subtract that from
the amount for which you are suing.
c. If for some reason (e.g.., your statute of lilnitations is about to
expire and you do not have rebate figures from your client)
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you sue for a gross amount (i.e., you do not rebate interest),
you should state that in the complaint, and you cannot begin
to accrue interest until the period through which interest is
already included in the note has passed.
d. Suing for the gross should be done only as a last resort
4. You can ask for interest in your suit
a. Ifyour contract provides for the payment of interest:
(1) you can get interest at the contract rate, whether higher
or lower than the statutory judgment rate
(2) from the date of acceleration until paid. - KRS
360.040, and Capitol Cadillac Olds, Inc. v Roberts,
813 S.W. 2d 287 (S.Ct. Ky. 1991)
b. Ifyour contract or debt is not interest bearing, you can get
interest:
(1) pre-judgment at the legal rate of 8% - KRS
360.010(1), and
(2) post-judgment at the judgment rate of 12%,
cOlnpounded annually - KRS 360.040
c. Pre-judglnent interest is awarded as a matter of course where
damages are liquidated. See, Faulkner Drilling Inc., v Gross,
943S.W. 2d 634 (Ky. Ct. App. 1997)
5. You can ask for attorney fees, ifyour contract provides for payment
of those fees
a. Generally: KRS 411.195 and Harper v Citizens State Bank,
652, S.W. 2d 871 (Ky.Ct.App., 1983). The attorney fees
must
(1) lnllst be agreed to be paid (i.e., a provision for the
recovery of attorney fees must be in the contract), and
(2) attorney fees cannot be paid to a regularly salaried
employee of the creditor
b. Suit by a bank on a revolving credit plan: KRS 287.750
(1) fees must be "reasonable", and
(2) not paid to a salaried employee of the bank or holder
of the note
c. Motor vehicle installment contracts: KRS 190.100(1)(d)
(1) not to exceed 15% of the amount due and payable, and
(2) cannot be paid to a regularly salaried employee of the
creditor
E. Service ofProcess
1. Personal delivery or restricted certified mail (delivery to addressee
only) - CR 4.01
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2. By sheriff or constable
3. By special bailiff: but only upon motion and order of the court
because other methods have failed
4. Constructive service (warning order attorney), but note that you
cannot get a personal judgment in this situation, only a judgment in
rem. This type service is usually restricted to foreclosure
proceedings where the object is to foreclose on the lien against the
thing, and not necessarily a personal judgement against the person.
F. Foreign Judgements
1. Kentucky has adopted the Uniform Enforcement ofForeign
Judgements Act - KRS 426.950-975
2. Notice (note, this is not service) by ordinary mail is allowed for
"suits" on foreign judgments
3. You do not have to file a new action based upon the judgment
obtained in a sister state.
4. You file the Notice along with an Affidavit of counsel for the
creditor. Attached to the Affidavit is an authenticated copy of the
foreign judgelnent
5. You must then wait twenty (20) days before you can issue execution
on the judgment.
6. Prudence would dictate that you allow an additional three (3) days
for mailing
7. Additionally, KRS 426.030 forbids execution for ten (10) days after
judgement.
8. Therefore, you should not issue execution on a foreign judgment for
thirty-three (33) days after Notice is sent to the judgment defendant
9. NOTE: you must still comply with the jurisdiction and venue rules
covered in section II(B), supra
10. Kentucky has adopted a uniform pleading issued by the
Adlninistrative Office of the Court, AOC 160
III. Moving for judgment
A. Default Judgelnents - CR 55
1. The debtor has twenty (20) days to answer a complaint - CR 12.01
2. If service is by mail, you do not need to add another three (3) days to
the answer period under CR 6.05. That statute specifically exempts
from its scope CR 4.01(1)(a)
3. The defendant could lnove for an enlargement ofthat time, ex parte
- CR6.02
4. If the defendant is properly served, and fails to timely file an answer,
then the plaintiff lnay lnove the court for a judglnent by default
a. Any responsive "pleading" should be considered an "answer"
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for purposes of this rule
b. Even if the only thing you get is a letter from the defendant in
response to the complaint, you should consider that a
response. This is so even if the letter is not filed with the
court by the defendant. You, as the attorney, have an ethical
obligation to file that with the court and treat it as an answer.
5. Procedure for moving for default judgment
a. File a written motion with the court
b. Accompanied by a certificate from you as the attorney that
(1) no papers have been served on you by the party in
default - CR 55.01
(2) and that the defendant is not in the active military
service (to satisfy the Federal Soldiers and Sailors'
Civil Relief Act, 50 USC Appx. §§501 et seq.)
c. Check for local rules
(1) SOlne counties require that you put these on the motion
docket
(2) some require that the Inoving attorney appear
personally before the court will consider the motion
(3) some require that you serve a copy of the Notice,
Motion, Affidavit and tendered Judgment on the
defaulting party
(4) some require the filing of an Affidavit for attorney
fees (See also, discussion ofKRS 411.195, supra)
(5) some have special fonns that you have to use or the
motion will be summarily overruled (e.g., the Default
Judgment Certificate that must be filed in Jefferson
Circuit Court)
d. Once judgInent is rendered, you cannot issue execution for
ten (10) days. But see the next sectionfor a helpful hint
B. How to craft your judgment so you can begin execution in less than ten
(10) days even if there are multiple defendants
1. KRS 426.030 prohibits executing on a judgment for ten (10) days,
unless there is a determination by the court to the contrary
2. Your judgment has to be final as to all defendants - CR 54.01 & .02
3. Therefore all money judgments against multiple parties should be
concluded with the following sentence: "This is a final judgment
and there is no just reason for delay." See, Singer v Arnold, 436
s.w. 2d 493 (Ky. Ct. App., 1969)
4. This is the duty and responsibility of the drafting attorney
5. Failure to have this language could also be a hurdle to appeal, i.e.,
you can appeal only a final judgment. See, Turner Construction v
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Smith Brothers, 295 S.W. 2d 569 (Ky. Ct. App., 1956) and Hale v
Deaton, 528 S.W. 2d 719 (Ky. Ct. App. 1972)
6. This is true whether you are movinf for default judgment, summary
judgment, for a judgement on the pleadings or a judgment after trial
C. Judgment on the Pleadings - CR 12.03
1. Many time the "responsive pleading" filed by the defendant will not
raise a defense
a. "I cannot afford to pay this"
b. "My husband was supposed to have paid for this as part of our
divorce"
c. "I want to set up payments"
d. "I am thinking about filing bankruptcy, but 1 cannot afford an
attorney"
e. "1 am a sovereign entity within these United States and I do
not recognize your laws"
2. When the pleadings, taken as a whole, fail to raise any defense to the
allegations in the complaint, then a Judgement on the Pleadings is
appropriate
3. Procedure for filing
a. File a written motion with the court, attaching the answer
(especially if it has not been filed with the court)
b. File a short Inemorandum setting out the rule and the fact the
"answer" does not raise a defense at law
c. Ifyou are moving for attorney fees, and local rules require it,
file an affidavit for attorney fees
d. Tender a judgment to the court including the language set out
in , III (B)
e. Serve a copy ofthe pleadings on the defendant and include a
certificate of service delnonstrating to the court that you have
done so
f. Place the matter on the court's docket
4. NOTE: Ifyou require the court to consider any matters that are
outside the court's records, then the court shall treat the motion as if
it were filed under CR 56 (Summary Judgment)
5. Accordingly, sometimes it may be more prudent to simply move for
summary judgment. The downside is that you have to procure an
affidavit from your client to move for summary judgment, which
could slow the process
D. Summary Judgment - CR 56
1. In order to move for summary judgment, you must demonstrate to the
court that there is no genuine issue of any material fact to be decided
by a judge or jury
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2. Note that you could move for summary judgment on liability and
then take further evidence on the issue of damages. See, CR 56.03
3. Procedure for filing motion for sumlnary judgment
a. File a written motion with the court with notice of a hearing
(unless you are in Jefferson Circuit Court where no hearing is
required)
b. File a memorandum demonstrating that even taking the facts
in a light most favorable to the defendant, when you apply the
law to the facts, there is no genuine issue of a material fact to
be decided by the court or a jury
c. File an affidavit with the court
(1) the affidavit should be from your client (the custodian
of the documents)
(2) it should have attached to it all the doculnents from
your client's file to prove your case. E.g.:
(a) the note
(b) a print out or other documentation evidencing
the amount asked your in your complaint
(c) the steps you took to liquidate your collateral
(d) basically, anything that you need to put into
evidence in order to sustain your burden of
persuasion and proof
d. File a tendered judgment
4. The debtor can file a counter affidavit with the court
a. That affidavit is to be filed on the day prior to the hearing at
the latest
b. If opposing counsel attempts to tender the affidavit on the day
of the hearing, it should be rejected and you should ask the
court not to consider it
c. If the opposing counsel brings his client to the hearing to
"testify", you should oppose this
(1) the hearing on a motion for summary judgment is not
an evidentiary hearing
(2) this is nothing more than an "oral affidavit" and it
should have been filed with the court on the day before
the hearing at the latest
5. Many people feel that Summary Judgment is practically impossible to
get after the Kentucky Supreme Court's decision in Steelvest, Inc., v
Scansteel Service Center, Inc., 807 S.W. 2d 476 (1991) [Note: this is
applicable to Inotions for sUlnlnary judgment brought in state court,
only. For the federal court standard, see, Celotex Com. v Catrett,
477 US 317, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (1986). I do not agree
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Trial
1.
2.
E.
6. Recent cases show that if the motion is properly supported that
summary judgment should be granted
a. You may have to conduct written discovery before you file for
summary judgment
b. You may have to take the defendant's deposition before
summary judgment
c. You may not be able to rely simply on the answer filed by the
defendant, your memorandUlTI of law and your client's
affidavit.
d. Welsch v American Publishing Co., 3 S.W.3d 724 (S.Ct. Ky.
1999) specifically held that Steelvest did not repeal CR 56: "
Since rendition of our decision in Steelvest v. Scansteel
[citation olnitted], on the question of the proper standard for
deciding summary judgment lTIotions, much attention has been
given to the use of the word "impossible." ... The inquiry
should be whether, froln the evidence ofrecord, facts exist
which would lnake it possible for the non-Inoving party to
prevail. In the analysis, the focus should be on what is of
record rather than what might be presented at trial."
(Elnphasis added) Id. at 730
Proper trial techniques are a selninar in and of themselves
You must be prepared to take even the most routine collection case to
trial
a. Ifyou dodge trials, then that word will get out
b. You will see lnore answers filed ifyou refuse to try the cases
c. You will see fewer defendant's counsel willing to negotiate a
settlement unless they know that you will take the case to the
mat
3. Many times, creditors will send you the most junior of employees as
a witness
a. They see a trial as a cost of doing business
b. They may have already written off the debt and do not want to
waste any more valuable time in sending senior people to trial
4. You need to take the time to prepare the new witness
a. Take them to depositions in the case
b. Take them into the courtroom early so they can get used to the
surroundings
c. Meet with them the day before the trial and go over their
testimony so they can get used to the questioning
d. Cross exalnine them hard, so they will not be surprised or put
off at trial
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e. Make sure they have assembled the entire file. You want no
surprises at trial
f. Go through that file to lnake sure that YOU are not getting any
last minute surprises
g. Make sure the witness knows the content of the file such that
they can locate any document they need quickly
IV. Navigating common defenses. The following are a synopsis ofmany of the
common defenses filed in response to consumer collection cases. This is by no
means an exhaustive list.
A. Failure to state a claim
1. CR 8.01 requires
a. a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief and,
b. a demand for judgment for the relief to which he deems
himself entitled.
c. Relief in the alternative or of several different types may be
demanded.
2. Nothing lnore is required to state a claim. See generally, Morgan v
O'Neil, 652 S.W.2d 83 (1983); Caldwell v Frazier, 304 S.W. 2d 922
(1957)
3. There is also an Appendix of Official Forms found at the end of the
Civil Rules
4. CR 84 states that: "The forms contained in the Appendix ofForms
are sufficient under the rules and are intended to indicate the
simplicity and brevity of statelnent which the rules contemplate."
5. Official Form 2 is a Complaint on a Promissory Note
6. Official Form 3 is a Complaint on an Account
7. Official Fonn 4 is a Complaint for Goods Sold and Delivered
8. Official Form 5 is a Complaint for Money Lent
9. Ifyou have used one of these fonns, or a close adaptation to it, you
should be able to survive this "defense."
B. Promissory Estoppel
a. Elements set out in the case of In Meade Const. Co. v.
Mansfield Commercial Elec., Ky., 579 S.W.2d 105, 106
(1979)
b. Supreme Court ofKentucky referred to the doctrine of
promissory estoppel as set forth in the Restatement (Second)
of Contracts § 90 (1965):
(1) a promise
(2) which the prolnisor should reasonably expect to induce
action or forbearance
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(3) on the part of the promisee or a third person, and
(4) which does induce such action or forbearance
(5) is binding if injustice can be avoided only by
enforcement of the promise.
c. Said another way in the case of Gray v. Jackson Purchase
Prod. Credit, Ky.App., 691 S.W.2d 904, 906 (1985), the
elements of an estoppel are:
(1) conduct, including acts, language and silence,
amounting to a representation or concealment of
material facts;
(2) the estopped party is aware of these facts;
(3) these facts are unknown to the other party;
(4) the estopped party lnust act with the intention or
expectation his conduct will be acted upon; and
(5) the otller party in fact relied on this conduct to his
detriment.
d. Debtors will try to aver that some statelnent was made to them
that formed the basis of an estoppel.
e. This should not succeed
(1) this would be contrary to the parole evidence rule,
provided the contract contains an incorporation clause
(2) if the alleged statement was made before the contract
was signed, then all prior negotiations are incorporated
into the signed instrulnent
(3) iflnade after the contract was made, there is probably a
clause in the contract that says any modifications must
be in writing and signed by both parties
(4) there would be no consideration for any such
modification
C. Waiver
1. Defined as:
a. A voluntary and intentional surrender or relinquishment
b. Of a known right
c. Or an election to forgo an advantage
d. Which the party at his option may have may have demanded
or insisted upon
e. See, Greathouse v. Shreve, Ky., 891 S.W.2d 387, 390 (1995)
(quoting Barker v. Steams Coal & Lumber Co., 291 Ky. 184,
163 S.W.2d 466, 470 (1942)).
2. Any waiver must be intentional. Rarely will a creditor waive a
known right or advantage
3. The defendant would have the burden to show that any waiver was
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voluntary and intentional. This is a heavy burden.
D. Laches
1. Generally, statutes of limitations guard against the prejudicial delay
that the equitable docterine of laches was created deter.
2. Usually, if a party has brought a cause of action within the applicable
statute of limitations, then the docterine of laches should not lie.
3. In some circumstances, courts have allowed laches to proceed
forward even though the statute of limitations has not expired
4. "In such case the laches of the party refused relief must be made to
operate as an equitable estoppel to a recovery, in order to prevent
injustice being done the opposite party." Radford's Adm'rs v Harris,
139 S.W. 963 (Ct. App. Ky., 1911)
5. Perhaps such an argument could be made in a case where the statute
of limitations is lengthy (e.g., 15 year limitation period on a note)
6. In the situation ofa shorter statute of limitations, such an argument
should not lie.
E. Commercially Unreasonable disposition of collateral
1. This is one that you see in allTIOst every action to collect a deficiency
after the repossession and sale of collateral on a secured transaction
2. It is believed that by pleading this, an issue of fact is automatically
created preventing the creditor from obtaining a summary judgment
3. Many defendant's and their attorneys plead this rotely for this reason
4. An interesting perspective on the subject can be found at THE LOCH
NESS MONSTER, BIG FOOT, REPOSSESSION TITLES AND
OTHER MYTHS: DEFENSES AND COUNTERCLAIMS IN A
REPOSSESSIONAS ANALTERNATIVE TO BANKRUPTCY, 27 N.
Ky. L. Rev. 360, 363+ (2000) [I loved the title of the article so 1
had to include it if for no other reason!!!]
5. However the case ofHolt v People's Bank ofMt. Washington, 814
S.W. 2d 568 (S.Ct. Ky. 1991) made it clear that merely pleading this
will no longer suffice to act as a cOlnplete bar to recovery to a
deficiency claim.
6. The Kentucky Supreme Court found as follows: "It begins with a
presumption that the collateral is worth at least the amount of debt is
secures and the burden is cast upon the secured party to prove that its
commercial unreasonableness did not result in diminished proceeds,
or if it did, by what amount. Upon failure of the secured party to
prove that its conduct did not diminish the proceeds, the presumption
that the collateral is of sufficient value to satisfy the debt would
control and the claim for deficiency would be forfeited. It: in such
circumstances, a secured party is unwilling to depend entirely upon
the view, if any, that its conduct did not result in dilninished
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proceeds, it may present evidence as to the amount of damage it
caused and such sum will be deducted from the deficiency. To avoid
application ofthe presumption that the collateral is of sufficient value
to satisfy the debt, a secured party whose conduct has been found to
be commercially unreasonable must prove that its conduct did not
cause damage or ifit did, by what amount." Holt at 571.
7. The one exception to this rule is if the creditor fails to send notice. In
that event, the creditor's entire deficiency balance would be deemed
waived. Holt at 570
8. I have used Holt to my advantage
a. A defendant will plead this as a defense
b. I will, through discovery, find out what aspect of the sale or
repossession the defendant deems commercially unreasonable
c. I can many times attribute a dollar value to that perceived
"wrong" and agree to decrease the judgment I am seeking by
that amount (with client permission, of course)
d. I then get an Agreed Judglnent and get money coming in the
door, which is really what the client wants
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Hypothetical One
Wonderful Creditor has asked you to collect a judgment that he received against D.Ed
Beet (Ed to his friends) 12 years ago. Since that time, Ed has moved out of the
Commonwealth ofKentucky and has moved to the State ofFlorida. Ed is working as a
regional manager for Pizza Hut. You are aware that Florida's exemption statutes on
wages are healthy and executing on the judgment in Florida is impractical. What
questions do you ask Wonderful Creditor and do you take the case
Points ofDiscussion:
1. Is the 12 year old judgment still active and collectible?
2. Can you issue execution (wage garnishment) against Ed's Florida
Employer?
3. Ifyou can, do you have to commence that action in Florida, or could you
do it in Kentucky?
4. Ifyou can institute that action in Kentucky, do you use Florida's exemption
statutes or those ofKentucky?
Hypothetical Two
You have received a judgment against Will K. Pais (the "K" stands for Knott, since that
is the county where he was born). Will has no job, but owns several parcels of real
estate, some ofwhich are in the Corbin area. You believe that some ofthe properties are
rentals. You find that Will has a bank account where his some ofhis rentals are going,
but it is his wife's name only. You find another account where he is joint with his wife.
Points ofDiscussion:
1. Can you put a lien on Will's real estate?
2. Ifyou do, what county or counties should you file it in?
3. How can you get to the rental payments?
4. Can you attach the bank account that is in Will's wife's naIne, only?
5. Can you attach the bank account in both their names?
6. What additional information do you need and how will you get it?
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Hypothetical Three
Your debtor, Ima Scamer, works for her uncle Bud at a local beer distributor, Scamer
Suds. You have received a judgment against Ima and have served a wage garnishment
on Bud. Three weeks have passed and you have not received an answer to your
attachment. You actually get Bud to answer the phone and he tells you that she is not
working there. You tell him that you saw Ima driving a Suds truck this Inorning and he
answers that she had just returned from a leave of absence.
Points ofDiscussion:
1. What can you do to see ifBud is telling the truth?
2. IfBud is lying about Ima's employment, what can you do?
3. Could Bud be liable for any of the funds that you should have received
from Ima's wages?
4. What steps would you have to take to get Bud to pay the garnishment?
Hypothetical Four
Shelly B. Roake's only asset is a bank account at ABC Bank. Shelly's monthly pension
check is directly deposited into that account. Shelly also has some occasional
employment and cashes a lottery ticket from tilne to time. She also deposits this into that
same account. You serve a non-wage garnishment on the account and Shelly files a
challenge to it, claim that all the funds in the account are exempt.
Points ofDiscussion:
1. Can you attach the account?
2. Can you defeat Shelly's claim of exelnption?
3. Ifyou cannot defeat the exemption, can you get any money out of the
account?
4. What information do you need to make this decision?
5. How will you get that information?
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Hypothetical Five
Jon Ramsey and Bennett Ramsey, husband and wife own a piece ofproperty jointly.
You get ajudgment against Jon, only, and place a lien against the home.. Jon and
Bennett have no other assets to collect upon.
Points ofDiscussion:
1. What are your rights as against Bennett?
2. Can you foreclose your lien?
3. If Jon and Bennett sold the property, could you enforce your lien?
4. Ifyou can enforce your lien, how would you do that?
5. What is the amount you could realize upon the sale of the property?
6. If the mortgage that Jon and Bennett have was assumed and the property
later foreclosed upon, could you enforce your lien then?
7. Ifso, what would be the limit ofyour recovery?
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COMMERCIAL COLLECTIONS:
SPECIAL CONCERNS AND TECHNIQUES
INTRoDucTIoN
While it is common for the collection practitioner to represent creditors in a variety of
transactions, there are significant differences in the procedures employed and the applicable laws
governing the collection of retail and commercial debts. This outline will address many of the
practical as well as legal issues that confront the practitioner in the collection of commercial
obligations.
The outline will touch upon a variety ofsubstantive areas oflaw and procedures ofwhich the
commercial collection practitioner must be knowledgeable. The outline does not intend to provide
an exhaustive analysis of these areas, but rather is designed to assist in the proper recognition and
identification of important legal and procedural issues. These areas are (1) pertinent provisions of
Articles 2 and 9 ofthe Uniform Commercial Code, Sales and Secured Transactions (codified inKRS
at chapter 355); (2) Common law and statutory provisions relating to mechanic's liens, interest,
attorney's fees, venue, choice of law clauses, guaranties, accord and satisfaction, and evidence; (3)
Various Supreme Court Rules, relating to the Practice ofLaw, specifically, conflicts ofinterest, fees,
and the unauthorized practice oflaw by non-lawyers; and (4) Various Civil Rules regarding Pleading
and Practice, Service ofProcess, Discovery, and Summary Judgment.
In addition, the outline is intended to assist the commercial collection practitioner in the
development and improvement of streamlined handling procedures, and "fast track" litigation
techniques. In order to operate a high volume contingent collection practice profitably, it is
incumbent upon the collection practitioner to establish standard operating procedures to ensure the
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consistent and efficient handling of collection referrals. Periodic review of the various processes
better ensures overhead minimization and profit maximization per file.
I. IDENTIFICATION OF THE COMMERCIAL CLAIM
Giventhe significant differences governing the collection ofconsumerversus commercial debt
(and specifically the potential liabilities associated with the collection ofretail debt), it is incumbent
upon the collection practitioner to properly differentiate the two. While the differences may seem
obvious, and the intent ofthe creditor extending the credit may seem clear, ambiguities are common.
Blacks Law Dictionary defines "commercial" as follows:
Relates to or is connected with trade and traffic or commerce in general; is
occupied with business and commerce.
While there is no specific definition for commercial debt, "consumer debt" is defined as:
Debt incurred by an individual primarily for a personal, family, or household
purpose.
The collection practitioner should adopt a conservative approach in ascertaining the nature
of a given case. Probably the safest means of distinguishing commercial debt from consumer debt
is by process of elimination and in effect determining that it could not be construed as a consumer
transaction. The majority and prevailing view ofreported decisions construing the nature ofa debt
under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (1977), et seq., (hereinafter the
"F.D.C.P.A.") is to examine the nature ofthe underlying transaction. Ifthe nature ofthe underlying
transaction is for a personal, family or household purpose, then the obligation to pay is a debt
governed by the Act. There have been some aberration opinions including Sluys v. Hand, S.D. N.Y.,
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831 F.Supp. 321 (1993) wherein the court cited the Act's definition of "consumer" as meaning "any
natural person obligated or allegedly obligated to pay any debt." The court held "this definition
covers business debts if incurred by a .sole proprietor." In another similar decision, Moore v.
Principal Credit Corp (not reported in F.Supp.), 1998 WL 378, 387, the court determined that a
proprietor can be considered a consumer when contacted by a collector at home. However, the
majority view remains that a business obligation incurred by a natural person is not subject to the Act.
See Beaton v. Reynolds, Ridina=s, Vo~t & Mora=an, p.L.L.e., W.D. Okla., 986 F.Supp. 1360
(1998), where the court found that materials ordered by the debtor (a self-employed CPA) were for
use in her business. The court used the "underlying transaction" analysis and detennined the debt to
be commercial. The court tound irrelevant the debtor's claim that the materials were not actually
used in her business.
II. ETffiCAL CONSIDERATIONS
A. POTENTIAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST.
It is common for the commercial practitioner to receive multiple collection referrals against
the same debtor. SCR 3.130(1.7) Conflicts of Interest: General Rule, provides:
(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client if representation of that client will
be directly adverse to another client, unless:
(1) The lawyer reasonably believes the representation will
not adversely affect the relationship with the other client;
and
(2) Each client consents after consultation.
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(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if representation of that client may
be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or
to a third person, or by the lawyer's own interest, unless:
(1) The lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be
adversely.affected; .
(2) The client consents after consultation. When representation of
multiple clients in a single matter is undertaken, the consultation
shall include explanation of the implications of the common
representation and the advantages and risks involved.
There are obviously an infinite number ofexamples where the specific facts ofany given case
could impair the lawyer's ability to represent multiple clients against the same debtor. There are of
course times when after proper disclosure and consultation with each client that common
representation may in fact represent an advantage to the respective clients. However, one cannot
overstate the importance of making the determination on a case-by-case basis. There may be
occasions where merely seeking consent could run afoul of violation of confidences of the initial
existing client. See SCR 3.130(1.6) Confidentiality of Information which states in pertinent part:
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a
client unless the client consents after consultation, except for disclosures
that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation •••
A possible scenario could include a lawyer being consulted by a creditor about the possibility
offiling an involuntary petition in bankruptcy against a debtor from whom the lawyer has recently
garnished funds on behaIfofanother client. In this instance, representation ofthe second client could
jeopardize the rights ofthe original client's recovery. In addition, attempting to seek consent could
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result in possible violation ofconfidential information. Accordingly, the collection practitioner may
oftentimes find the best and safest alternative is to simply decline employment.
B. UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW.
SCR 3.020 Practice ofLaw Defined, states in pertinent part,
The practice oflaw is any service rendered involving legal knowledge or
legal advice, whether of representation, counselor advocacy in or out of
court, rendered in respect to the rights, duties, obligations, liabilities, or
business relations orone requiring the services.
It is common to employ lay persons in a collection practice in capacities which include
paralegals and collectors. Frequently these individuals are actively involved in the pre-litigation
collection and workout agreements, as well as during the litigation and post-judgment collection
process. However, care should be exercised in making sure non-lawyers are not rendering services
which may be considered the unauthorized practice oflaw. Appearing in court or signing pleadings
are obvious violations of the spirit and intent of the rules. SCR 3.130(5.3) Responsibilities,
Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants, sets forth the duty to make reasonable efforts to supervise and
oversee the non lawyer's conduct. In addition, SCR 3.700 Provisions Relating to Paralegals, is
a comprehensive rule outlining the rights, duties, and responsibilities of the lawyer in regard to
paralegals. SUB-RULE 2, recognizes the practical necessity of allowing paralegals to perfonn
important functions which are specifically excluded from the unauthorized practice oflaw so long as
the client understands the paralegal is not a lawyer and the .lawyer supervises the paralegal in
perfonning said duties. Paralegals and other non-lawyers should be clearly identified as non-lawyers
in all communications with clients and other third parties.
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c. FEES.
While the collection practitioner may be retained on an hourly basis, contingent fee
agreements between creditors and their collection counsel are more common. Contingency fee
agreements must be specific and must be in writing. SCR 3.130 (1.5) Fees, states in pertinent part:
(c) ••• a contingent fee agreement shall be in writing and should state the
method by which the fee is to be determined, including the percentage
or percentages that shall accrue to the lawyer in the event ofsettlement,
trial or appeal, litigation and other expenses to be deducted from the
recovery, and whether such expenses are to be deducted before or after
the contingent fee is calculated. Upon recovery of any amount in a
contingent fee matter, the lawyer shall provide the client with a written
statement stating the outcome of the matter and showing the remittance
to the client and the method of its determination.
Needless to say, contingent fee agreements should be clear and concise, thus reducing the
possibility of any misunderstanding. No attorney wants to find him or herselfin the midst ofa fee
controversy which could result in time-consuming, as well as expensive, legal fee arbitration pursuant
to SCR 3.810, Legal Fee Arbitration.
Once counsel has agreed to accept employment) an acknowledgment should be sent to the
client confirming receipt ofthe matter, the fee agreement, and any other specific terms under which
employment is being accepted. A sample initial acknowledgment letter is attached for reference (see
Attachment No.1). A sample contingent fee agreement is attached as well (see Attachment No.2).
ill. REVIEW AND ANALYSIS of THE COMMERCIAL CLAIM
Without oversimplifying the nature of retail collection matters, the typical retail collection
matter is a "point and shoot" collection mission. Generally the retail case is for the collection of a
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debt subject to an installment note or credit card agreement for a specific liquidated balance due, from
a specific individual debtor, or possibly co-debtors. The retail client usually provides substantive
detailed information about the debtor which may include name, address, phone number, employment,
social security information and other non-public information that may have been obtained from the
debtor at the time the credit was issued or possibly from other third party credit reporting agencies.
In contrast to the detail ora retail case,"the commercial practitioner may be supplied with little
more than the name ofa business (which may be a trade style or assumed name), a balance due, and
perhaps a statement ofaccount. The nature ofopen account trade debt is such that it is common for
the commercial credit grantor to extend thousands ofdollars ofcredit to a business with little, ifany,
specific information about the legal identity of the business, its ownership, or its financial stability.
Initial review ofthe commercial referral should include an examination ofthe client's file and
all documentary evidence in support ofthe claim. An early determination as to the strength and any
weakness ofthe creditor's claim will ensure a more efficient and profitable handling ofthe case. The
initial consultation with the creditor as well as a review ofthe creditor's documentary evidence should
reveal if the following are available:
(a) A written contract between the parties. This may consist of a variety of
purchase orders and/or order acknowledgments.
(b) A signed credit application.
(c) Personal guaranties executed by the priqcipals ofa corporation or other third
party guarantors.
(d) Promissory notes.
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(e) Payment and/or perfonnance bonds.
(f) Lease Agreement.
(g) Itemized invoices.
(h) Itemized statements reflecting debits and credits.
(i) Proofs ofdelivery.
(j) Copies ofchecks for prior partial payments received.
(k) Written acknowledgments ofthe debt from the debtor, including promises of
payment.
(1) Correspondence generated by the creditor confirming prior promises of
payment, disputes, and attempted resolution.
(m) Records ofcollection attempts and collector notes made by the credit grantor
or any other third party collecting agent.
In reviewing the documentary evidence available to support the creditor's claim, counsel
should be better able to evaluate and determine the following:
(a) The prospects of collection of the claim, taking into account any prior
experience against the debtor.
(b) The terms ofthe contract between the parties.
(c) The existence ofknown disputes or threatened counterclaims.
(d) The quantity and quality of supporting documentary evidence, as well as
availability of potential witnesses in the event a lawsuit should become
contested.
(e) The possibility of litigating in a hostile venue.
(f) The creditor's expectation. Does the client want the money or its "Pound of
Flesh?"
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IV. IDENTIFYING SPECIAL LEVERAGE
While the vast majority ofcommercial collection referrals involve the collection ofa debt on
an open account for goods sold and delivered, the specific facts of any given case may entitle the
creditor to special remedies that may enable greater leverage.
A. RIGHT OF REPOSSESSION PURSUANT TO A SECURITY AGREEMENT.
Assuming the creditor possesses a valid and enforceable security agreement against specific
collateral, all pursuant to KRS 355.9-203, and has properly perfected that interest, the creditor is
entitled to the various remedies provided to an Article 9 secured party, including, but not limited to,
the right to take possession after default as provided at KRS 355.9-609.
B. RECLAMATION.
Many times an overlooked, but potentially effective remedy is available to the
seller/creditor who has recently shipped goods to a buyer, soon thereafter discovered to be insolvent.
KRS 355.2-702 Seller's Remedies on Discovery ofBuyer's Insolvency provides in pertinent part:
(2) Where the seller discovers that the buyer has received goods on credit
while insolvent he may reclaim the goods upon demand made within ten
(10) days after the receipt, but if misrepresentation ofsolvency has been
made to the particular seller in writing within three (3) months before
delivery the ten (10) day limitation does not apply. Except as provided
in this subsection the seller may not base a right to reclaim goods on the
buyer's fraudulent or innocent misrepresentation ofsolvency or ofintent
to pay.
(3) The seller's right to recl~im under subsection (2) is subject to the rights
of a buyer in ordinary course or other good faith purchaser under this
article (KRS 355.2-403). Successful reclamation of goods excludes all
other remedies with respect to them.
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The remedy is limited in a number ofways. First, there is the issue ofwhether the buyer is
truly insolvent. KRS 355.1-201(23) provides the person is insolvent when he "either has ceased
to pay his debts in the ordinary course ·ofbusiness or cannot pay his debts as they become due
or is insolvent within the meaning or the Cederal bankruptcy law."
Furthermore, the seller must make demand for return ofthe goods within ten days after the
buyer receives them. The ten-day limitation does not apply ifmisrepresentations of solvency have
been made to the particular seller in writing within three months before delivery. In the event the
debtor should file bankruptcy within ten days of receipt ofgoods, written notice is required when
making demand and additionally, the creditor's time for making the written demand for reclamation
is extended an additional ten days in this instance.
Finally, it should be understood that the rights ofreclaiming seller are subject to the rights of
buyers in the ordinary course ofbusiness or other good faith purchasers. In particular, the reclaiming
seller may find itselfcompeting with the debtor's lending institution who holds a previously perfected
security interest in all goods ofthe debtor, including inventory. While the cases are mixed, most cases
seem to favor the rights ofthe secured lender. A detailed analysis ofthe rights and limitations ofthe
reclaiming seller can be found in the reference book titled The Uiliform Commercial Code of
Kentucky. David J. Leibson & Richard H. Nowka, The Ul1iform Commercial Code ofKentucky, §
2.6(F)(S)(2d Ed. 1992).
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c. MECHANIC'S LIENslPAYMENT BONDs.
Ifavailable, Mechanic's Liens and possible payment bond rights can offer an excellent source
ofleverage in instances where the creditor has provided labor or furnished materials for the erection,
altering or repairing, and other improvements upon real estate.
Mechanic's Liens, while effective, are subject to'very specific and stringent limitation. Careful
analysis should be made to dete~ine whether pre-lien notice is required. In addition to the possibility
ofrequired pre-lien notice, careful effort should be made not to miss the appropriate lien deadlines,
all pursuant to KRS 376.010 and KRS 376.080.
Mechanic's Liens, being creatures ofstatute, are strictly construed. See Laferty v. \Vickes
Lumber Co., Ky. App., 708 S.W.2d 107 (1986) where the court noted that statutory provisions for
perfecting the lien must be strictly followed or the lien claim is lost. In Laferty, Wickes argued that
the timely filing of litigation within the mechanic's lien notice period constituted compliance with
placing the debtor on written notice. The court concluded a complaint, although written and served,
does not substitute for or constitute the written notice required by the statute and therefore did not
serve to perfect the Wickes' lien.
Additionally, counsel should be aware that there is a completely different set of statutes
relating to liens for labor and/or materials provided on public property that represent public
improvements. Rather than acquiring a lien against the real estate, the ~laimant acquires a lien against
funds due the contractor. Pertinent statutes include KRS 376.210 defining the creation ofthe lien,
and KRS 376.230 detailing the necessary steps and extremely stringent time deadlines to properly
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perfect and enforce a public improvement lien. Should the property on which the improvement
occurred be "public work" for the use and benefit ofthe United States (Government), then counsel
will need to review "The Miller Act," 40U.S.C. §§ 270a-270d-l (1994). The Miller Act provides
bond rights for the protection of persons furnishing labor and materials.
Finally, even if counsel determines that any possible Mechanic's Lien rights have expired,
inquiries should be made to detet:rnine the possible existence of any payment bonds. This type of
bond may inure to the benefit ofthe client as a contemplated and intended third party beneficiary of
the bond contract. Payment bonds may offer the creditor and creditor's counsel yet another source
ofpossible collection. Like any other contract, payment bonds are not without limitation and efforts
should be made to obtain a copy ofany payment bond as quickly as possible to ensure compliance
with any pre-suit notice requirements and to ensure that the claimant is within the scope of the
intended protection provided by the bond.
D. ATTORNEY'S FEES.
Attorney's fees and collection costs are recoverable pursuant to KRS 411.195 Enforceability
of written agreement to pay attorneys fees in event of default.
In addition to providing additional leverage during pre-suit collection, these agreements can
be helpful in conjunction with settlement negotiations after suit has been filed and ofcourse during
post-judgment collection. Tenns incorporating payment ofattorneys/collection fees can sometimes
be incorporated into pre-suit workout agreements, as will be discussed in greater detail below in
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regard to workout techniques, should the client not have the benefit of a credit agreement or other
contract providing for payment of these expenses.
However, the collection of attorney's fees and collection costs are not without limitation
where the case is contested. See Capitol cadillacOlds. Inc. v. Roberts, Ky., 813 S.W.2d 287
(1991). See also DinKus v. FADA Service Co., Inc., Ky. App., 856 ~.W.2d 45 (1993). In both
r
instances the courts considered "the time involved, the task assigned, and the degree ofdifficulty of
work under the circumstances." The problem is that this assumes losing defendants will promptly pay
any Judgment rendered, including any court-awarded fees. The fact is that in the vast majority of
cases, more time is expended securing collection subsequent to the entry of judgment than prior
thereto.
What about in those instances where the case is not contested? Many courts will still consider
the circumstances of the case in awarding requested fees. In the Jefferson Circuit Court, JRP 404
requires any request for attorney's fees to include an itemization oftime expended, by date, service
rendered, the nature ofthe service rendered, the name ofthe person(s) performing said service, and
time expended, as well as total time, together with a reasonable amount ofcompensation per hour.
This is to be in the form of affidavit and if the request is pursuant to KRS 411.195, it should be
supported with a showing that the requested fees have been paid, or have agreed to be paid, by the
party seeking enforcement.
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E. GUARANTIES.
Personal continuing guaranties of payment are commonly used by commercial creditors to
obtain a guaranty of payment from the principals and owners of corporations and limited liability
e~tities. Kentucky has a stringent statute regarding the enforceability ofguaranties. KRS 371.065
Requirements for valid, enforceable guaranty.
(1) No guaranty ofan indebtedness which is either not written 00, or
does not expressly refer to, the instrument or instruments, being
guaranteed shall be valid or enforceable unless it is in writing
signed by the guarantor and cor:ttains provisions specifying the
amount of the maximum aggregate liability of the guarantor
thereunder, and the date on which the guaranty terminates.
Termination of tbe guaranty on that date shall not affect the
liability of the guarantor with respect to:
(a) Obligations created or incurred prior to the date; or
(b) Extensions or renewals of, interest accruing on, or
fees, costs or expenses incurred with respect to, the
obligations on or after the date.
Certainly .the statute makes it clear that guaranties represent an extraordinary remedy in
Kentucky. The statute seems poorly written by any standard, and one must immediately wonder why
the use of the word "instrument?" Instrument is only defined in KRS 355.3-104(2) as referring to
a negotiable instrument. Given the fact that statutes are interpreted according to the plain meaning
of the words, in a narrow and conservative manner, any guaranty not written on a negotiable
instrument, or one which does not expressly refer to the negotiable instrument(s) being guaranteed,
must contain the statutorily required maximum amount and termination date. Guaranties
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incorporated into credit agreements or other documents, which are not negotiable instruments, are
subject to the statute.
There are few cases interpreting KRS 371.065, but the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
a~dressed the applicability of the statute in the context ofa guaranty ~hich included a Tennessee
choice of law provision. Wallace Hardware Co., Inc. v. Abrams, 6th Cir. Ky., 223 F 3d 382
(2000). The Court, in upholding the Tennessee choice oflaw provision (against the Kentucky debtor
and guarantors), did not find that Kentucky's statutory restrictions on guaranties to be of such
fundamental interest to prevent the application of Tennessee law in enforcing the guaranty.
v. INITIAL DEMAND AND PRE-LITIGATION 'VORKOUT ATTEMPTS.
Whenever possible, coIIection without suit is more profitable. Initial written demand,
followed by telephonic demand, seeking an amicable and voluntary payment of the debt is certainly
recommended.
Collection ofthe account is the obvious mission and when collection can be effected without
resorting to litigation, a number of risks and expenses can be avoided. In addition to providing an
opportunity for anucable resolution, written demand and telephone follow-up will enable counsel to
make some additional investigations and determinations.
A. DETERMINATION OF THE PROPER LEGAL IDENTITY OF THE DEBTOR.
If there is any question as to the debtor's correct identity, initial efforts should include a
check with the Secretary of State's office to determine if the debtor is in fact a legally incorporated
entity or limited liability company. The information can be obtained by calling the Secretary
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of State's office at (502) 564-7330 Of, alternatively, accessed on line at
www.sos.state.ley.us!corporate2/entityname.asp.
The Secretary ofState's office also includes listings ofgeneral and limited partnerships which
can be of valuable assistance in detennining the correct legal identity of a business that is not
otherwise a legally incorporated entity or a limited liability company. Careful effort should be made
to detennine a proper match between any such local entities and the creditor's account debtor. Initial
complications may arise should the debtor utilize a trade style or assumed name that may not be listed
with the Secretary ofState's office or the County Clerk's Office as required by KRS 365.015. Ifthe
debtor is an incorporated entity or a limited liability company, careful note should be made as to the
date that the entity became incorporated as well as a determination as to whether the entity is in good
standing or possibly has had its charter revoked for any number ofreasons, which would principally
include the failure to file annual reports.
For debts incurred prior to incorporation KRS 271B.2-040 Liability for preincorporation
transactions provides, All persons purporting to act as or on behalf ofa corporation, knowing
there .was no incorporation under this chapter, shall be jointly and severally liable for all
liabilities created while so acting. After an entity has been suspended and its charter revoked, then
the owners/shareholders ofthe business may be personally responsible for the charges. KRS 271B.6-
220 Liability ofsItareholders, states in pertinent part (2) Unless otherwise provided in the articles
of incorporation, a shareholder of a corporation shall not be personally liable for the acts or
debts ofthe corporation except that he may become personally.liable by reason of his own acts
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or conduct. Accordingly, if there is no longer a corporation by virtue ofdissolution or revocation
of the charter, the owners/shareholders may be liable as successors to the corporate entity, in their
individual capacities. Prudent collection practitioners ~ould certainly wish to consider naming all
individual persons who may be liable as a result, as well as naming the entity itselfwhich can still be
sued pursuant to KRS 271B.14-0S0(2)(e). One limitation is the ability ofan entity to reinstate its
charter retroactively pursuant to KRS 271B.14-220, thus avoiding the possibility ofpersonal liability
to any owners. This, however, requires an affinnative response from the debtor, and the leverage of
possible personal liability may be sufficient to effect collection ofthe underlying balance.
Additional information that should be noted in regard to any corporation or limited liability
company is the name and address of the process agent for the corporation as well as the entity's
principal office address. CR 4.04(5) provides:
Service shall be made upon a corporation by serving an officer or managing
agent thereof, or the chief agent in the county where the action is brought, or
any other agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service on its
behalf.
However, where service for any reason cannot be obtained upon the resident agent or a
managing partner, there is an altemat~ method ofservice available. KRS 271B.5-040, Service on
Corporation provides in pertinent part as follows:
(2) If a corporation has no registered agent or the agent cannot with
reasonable diligence be served, the corporation may be served by
registered or certified mail, return receipt requested, addressed to the
secretary of the corporation at its principal office. Service shall be
perfected under the subsection at the earliest of:
(a) The date the corporation receives the mail;
E- 17
(b) The date shown on the return receipt, if signed on behalf of the
corporation; or
(c) Five (5) days after its deposit in the United States mail, as
evidenced by the postmark, if mailed postpaid and correctly
addressed.
(3) This section does not prescribe the only means, or necessarily the
required means, of serving a corporation.
The important point is that the statute does not seemingly require actual acceptance including a
signed delivery receipt. This is analogous to the long-ann statute, and the fact that actual acceptance
and an accompanying signed delivery receipt is not necessary to effect proper service.thereunder (as
will be covered later in the outline). .
Assuming the creditor does not have the benefit of an executed credit application that will
help determine the proper legal identity of the debtor, additional sources include any number of a
variety ofthird party credit service companies, one ofwhich is Business Credit Service which can be
accessed by telephone at 888-274-5325 or online at www.businessCreditUSA.com. Additional clues
may include check copies retained by the creditor from prior partial payments. Many times the checks
will include the correct legal name of the business which, as stated previously, may frequently be
different from the trade style used by the debtor in its day-to-day operations. Additionally, the check
infonnation could prove extremely valuable in the event that judgment is ultimately entered and
execution upon the judgment is required.
Finally, an obvious means ofattempting to detennine the proper legal identity of the debtor
is to simply ask the debtor during the course ofmaking a telephonic demand for payment. It cannot
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be overstated that in spite of the numerous technological advancements that have improved the
efficiency ofinfonnation-gathering techniques for the legal collection process, the telephone remains
the most powerful collection tool.
B. WHY IS THE DEBTOR NOT PAYING?
Careful review of the client's file as well as personal contact with the debtor should assist
counsel in determining why the account has not been paid. Is there any record ofa dispute? Has the
debtor currently raised a legitimate dispute or possible defense? Should a lawsuit be filed? Effective
telephone demand and negotiation can help pinpoint the existence of real versus imagined disputes
for nonpayment.
It is common to periodically receive cases against the same commercial debtors. Creditors'
counsel handling any volume of commercial collection work wiII recognize the "earmarks" of the
perpetual stalling debtor. Many commercial debtors are sophisticated operators who may well
understand the nature of the legal coIIection process. All debtors want more time. Granting more
time may make sense, particularly if counsel can improve the prospects of collection in return by
securing additional leverage.
The sooner counsel can detennine the specific reasons for nonpayment, the more
expeditiously and efficiently counsel can make an infonned legal recommendation to the client as to
whether a lawsuit may be required as a means ofeffecting quicker collection.
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c. WORKOlIT TECHNIQUES.
1. Sec1lrin¥ a written acla10wledwent and promise ofpayment. Once counsel
determines that the debtor is simply suffering cash flow problems and needs time to pay, every effort
s~ould be made to obtain a written acknowledgment ofthe debt and promise to pay. Preferably, there
should be a letter or other document signed by the debtor acknowledging the outstanding balance and
making a specific promise ofpayment. Obvious benefits include the possibilityofextracting voluntary
payments from the debtor, and at a minimum posturing the case for a much speedier resolution should
a lawsuit ultimately need to be filed. A debtor who has acknowledged in writing the validity ofthe
debt and who has made a written commitment for payment is much more inclined to follow through
with voluntary payment. A debtor who is unwilling to provide a written acknowledgment of an
obligation in return for more time to pay is, at best, a recalcitrant debtor who has no intention of
making payment on a voluntary basis, and may perhaps be attempting to preserve the right to create
a belated defense or dispute for nonpayment should a suit be filed
While a signed writing from the debtor is preferred, email is an additional method of
extracting an acknowledgment and promise ofpayment. Additionally, should the debtor promise to
provide a written acknowledgment and promise ofpayment and fail to follow through, it is a good
idea to send the debtor a letter confirming any telephone conversations wherein the debtor has
acknowledged the obligation, requesting that the letter be signed and either faxed or mailed back to
counsel.
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2. EreCt/tiol1 ora Promissory Note. Where possible, execution of a note by a
debtor is preferred for a number of reasons over and above a simple written acknowledgment and
promise for payment of the debt. The .promissory note, in addition to representing an absolute,
unconditional promise of payment on a set date or over a specific interval, also offers creditort s
counsel the opportunity to obtain additional remedies and leverage for the creditor client. For
instance, should the creditor not have the benefit of a signed credit application or other written
contract providing for a specific rate ofinterest, the promissory note offers counsel the opportunity
to enhance not only ultimate collection of the creditor's claim, but ensures that the creditor is
obtaining additional value for the consideration of additional time and the forbearance of suit. The
note also offers an opportunity to obtain a commitment for the payment ofcollection costs, including
attorney's fees, in the event that the creditor does not already possess a signed writing for the
payment of said expenses.
The extension ofadditional time, and forbearance ofsuit, represent valuable consideration to
support interest and attorney's fees. See Murphy v. Henry, Ky., 225 S.W.2d 662 (1950) where
the court stated "It is well settled in this state, as in others, that forebearance to prosecute a doubtful
claim asserted in good faith will constitute adequate consideration for a compromise agreement." In
Hall v. Fuller, Ky., 352 S.W.2d 559 (1962), in reviewing the three standards for determination of
forbearance as valid consideration, the court stated "We believe the sound viewpoint to be that good
faith is enough unless the claim is so obviously unfounded that the assertion of good faith would
affront the intelligence of the ordinary and reasonable layman."
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Additionally, the promissory note may offer the creditor the opportunity to obtain execution
of the note by the individual owner(s) (assuming the entity is a corporation or limited liability
company) in the event that the creditor does not otherwise enjoy the benefit ofa personal guaranty.
T~s is something that must be negotiated on a case-by-case basis and will, in most cases, be
detennined by how honest and earnest the debtor is to remain in the creditor's good graces. This is
more likely iri instances where the creditor may offer goods, merchandise, and/or services that the
debtor cannot readily obtain elsewhere.
3. Agreed Jlldgmel11s. Probably the most powerful pre-suit collection tool
available to collection counsel is securing an agreed judgment from the commercial debtor pre-suit.
Better than a written acknowledgment of the debt or a promissory note, the agreed judgment
represents an immediate, absolute, and seemingly indefensible right ofcollection, with all ofthe power
ofa judgment, including the right to execute.
While the concept ofobtaining execution ofan agreed judgment prior to filing suit may seem
extraordinary, there is Kentucky law upholding and supporting such a judgment. See Ashland
Armco Employees Credit Union v. Cantrell, Ky. App., 685 S.W.2d 559 (1985) where creditor's
counsel secured an agreed judgment from the debtor providing for a specific payment arrangement.
When the debtor defaulted suit was filed, and four days later the previously obtained agreed judgment
was submitted to the court and entered two days later. The debtor successfully filed a motion to
t.
vacate the agreed judgment as allegedly in violation ofKRS 372.140 which provides in pertinent
part:
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(1) Any power ofattorney to confess judgment or to sufTer judgment to pass
by default or othenvise,any release of errors, given before an action is
instituted, is void.
The Court ofAppeals reinstated the agreed judgment, finding that the agreed judgment entered into
between the parties was in essence a consent judgment, thereby distinguishing thejudgment from an
otherwise unenforceable and void cognovit note or judgment.
The important distinction is that at the time the agreed judgment is obtained, there is an
existing right ofaction by virtue ofthe fact that there is a debt for a liquidated amount for which the
creditor is entitled to immediate payment. This is distinguishable from the prohibited cognovit clause
wherein the debtor confesses judgment prior to any default in payment and essentially waives any
right to later defend. Careful attention should be made that the above-noted cases seemingly involved
consumer debts and were decided prior to the loss ofexemption under the F.D.C.P.A. for attorneys
as third party collectors. While opinions may differ, current attempts to secure pre-suit agreed
judgments on consumer obligations may be hazardous. Given the "least sophisticated consumer"
standard under the F.D.C.P.A., such a collection effort could be alleged an unfair, misleading, and/or
possibly a deceptive collection practice.
VI. coLLECTION LmGATION
A. FII"ING THE ACTION.
1. Assimilation ofNecessary DOCllmentation.
Once counsel has determined that litigation will be necessary, it is recommended that counsel
have available the necessary documentary evidence to establish a prima facie case for collection.
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However, this is not to say that all ofthe documentation is required to be attached to the Complaint
as exhibits thereto when filing the action. Generally, a single sheet statement ofaccount will suffice
to at least set forth the creditor's claim, all pursuant to CR 8.01, Claims for Relief, which in
pertinent part provides:
1. A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, ••• shall contain (a) a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief and (b) a demand for judgment for the relief to which be deems
himself entitled. Relief in the alternative or in several different types
may be demanded.
Furthermore, CR 8.05, Pleading to be Concise and Direct; Consistency, provides in pertinent
part:
(1) Each averlllent of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct. No
technical forms of pleadings or motions are required.
Paragraph (2) ofCR 8.05 also provides that claims may be made alternatively or hypothetically and
separate claims may be stated regardless ofconsistency and whether based on legal or on equitable
grounds or both, all subject to CR 11.
While not specifically required by Kentucky law, affidavits of account can be helpful,
particularly in certain Kentucky courts where sworn proofofa debt may result in the speedier entry
ofa default judgment should there be no defense to the claim. Generally speaking, the more concise
the cause ofaction is pled the better, keeping in mind ofcourse that counsel should plead the cause
ofaction with enough particularity to avoid the possibility ofa ~uisance motion to dismiss pursuant
to CR 12.02, including but not limited to subpart (f) failure to state a claim upon which relief can
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be granted (a sample Complaint and Affidavit in support ofan open account debt are attached hereto
as Attachment No.3).
2. Choosinf the Proper COllrl. Pursuant to KRS 24A.120(1)(a), jurisdiction of
district court is limited to causes ofaction which do not exceed $4,000.00 exclusive ofinterest and
costs, except matters affecting title to real estate and matters of equity. For matters in excess of
$4,000 exclusive ofinterest and costs, or matters involving title to real estate or equity, suit should
be filed in the circuit court pursuant to KRS 23A.OIO.
Just as important as jurisdiction is proper venue. Suit should be filed in the appropriate venue
to avoid the entry ofajudgment that would otherwise be void and unenforceable. Kentucky statutory
law addresses original venue in civil actions at KRS 452.400 et seq. This compilation of statutes
specifically designates specific types of actions and where their venue is appropriate. One of the
primary venue rules is.KRS 452.450. Excepting certain actions as found in this particular chapter,
KRS 452.450 dictates that "an action against a corporation which has an office or place of
business in this state, or a chief officer or agent residing in this state, must be brought in the
county in which such office or place of business is situated, or in which such officer or agent
resides." Alternatively, the statute continues by stating that if"[t]he action be upon a contract, in
the above named county, or in the county in which the contract is made or to be performed;
or if it be for a tort, in the first named county or the county in which the tort is committed."
KRS 452.450 has been interpreted by Kentucky courts to include appropriate venue as being
in a county where the designated registered office and agent are present, as specified by the
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corporation, or ifthe action involves a security agreement and note, the action can be brought in the
county where the payments are to be made. Kern 1\fanufacturin2 Corp. v. Kentucky Gem Coal
Co., Ky. App., 601 S.W.2d 913 (1980). Additionally, this statute permits an action against a
corporation to be maintained in the county in which" a contract is to be perfonned. American Oil
Co. v. Brooks, Ky. 424 S.W.2d 831 (1967).
Kentucky statutory law also dictates where a transitory action may be brought. If such a
transitory action is not required to be brought in a specific venue under the provisions of KRS
452.400 to KRS 452.475, then KRS 452.480 provides that the action, " ••• may be brought in any
.
county in which the defendant, or in which one (1) ofseveral defendants, who may be properly
joined as such in the action, resides or is summoned." Of particular interest to collection
attorneys is when preferred venue is waived to permit jurisdiction in a more convenient forum.
Kentucky cases that date to 1869, as in Baker v. Louisville and N.R. Co., 67 Ky. 619 (1869),
acknowledge and still hold one ofthe most basic positions ofcivil procedure, namely, "a plea to the
jurisdiction of a court after a defense to the merits of an action has been made, unless for want of
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, comes too late since a defense to the merits of an
action. constitutes a waiver of the objection to the jurisdiction over the person of the defendant."
Another way that a defendant may waive the venue requirements ofKRS, is to have executed
a choice of forum clause contained in the contract. Provided the choice of forum is fair and
reasonable, Kentucky courts have held that such clauses are indeed enforceable, so long as there is
no fraud in the inducement. Cline v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., Ky. App., 690 S.\V.2d 764 (1985).
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One issue to evaluate in whether Kentucky courts will honor a choice offorum provision, is whether
Kentucky has a minimal interest in the particular lawsuit. The case ofPrudential Resources Corp.
v. Plunkett, Ky. App., 583 S.W.2d 97.(1979), analyzed such issue in light ofa choice offorum
provision selecting the State ofTexas. In upholding the lower court's decision to honor the choice
of forum clause, the Appellate Court stated "assuming that Kentucky has a substantial interest to
protect because ofa significant relationship to the transaction and to the parties, the Jackson Circuit
Court would have been warranted in refusing to enforce the forum selection agreement if the
application ofTexas I~w would have subverted an important policy ofKentucky and the choice of
law rule ofTexas would have been in favor of its own laws."
The collection attorney may also be faced with choosing the proper court when confronted
with a non-resident defendant. For a variety of reasons, it may make more sense to file suit in the
creditor's home state where "millimum COIl/acts" can be established. When such an instance occurs,
the creditor's attorney will nonnally rely on KRS 454.210 (the "long-ann statute") for purposes of
jurisdiction, service ofprocess, and venue requirements. KRS 454.210(4) states, in pertinent part,
that "when the exercise ofpersonal jurisdiction is authorized by this section, any action or suit
may be brought in the county wherein the plaintiff resides or where the cause of action or any
part thereof arose." Collection counsel will generally be relying upon subsection 2(a)(I)
Transacting any business in this Commonwealth to make effective use ofthis long-ann statute.
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A distinction can be drawn between resident purchasers attempting to assert jurisdiction over
a non-resident seller as opposed to resident sellers attempting to assert jurisdiction over non-resident
buyers. ~ee First National Bank ofLouisville v. Shore Tire Co., Inc., Ky. App., 651 S.W.2d 472
(1983). The Court ofAppeals considered three separate cases with very similarquestions oflaw, and
in a consolidated opinion made it clear that non-resident sellers who are actively promoting the sales
of their products within the forum state Kentucky, are invoking the benefits of that state, and thus
should be subject to the jurisdiction of Kentucky's courts. This was distinguished from the non-
resident buyer who enjoys no particular privilege in purchasing from the resident seller in an isolated
transaction. The court found that when non-resident buyers engage in interstate transactions with
resident sellers, each has transacted business in both states. The more substantial in terms of
frequency oftransactions, time over which each has done business with one another, and the amount
of money involved, will determine if the minimum contacts test established by International Shoe
Co. v. Washineton Case, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945), has been satisfied.
An important point not to be overlooked is the fact that service via KRS 454.210 does not
require a signed delivery receipt. See Haven Point Enterprises v. United Kentucky Bank, Inc.,
Ky., 690 S.W.2d 393 (1985), where the court found "The Statute says in part that the Secretary
shall attach to the return the registry receipt, ifany. The words 'if any-' emphasize the fact that
recovery ofa signed, returned receipt is not vital to the completion of service pursuant to the long-
arm statute." Another important point to be gleaned from Haven Point is the fact that service on
the Secretary ofState under the long-arm statute (KRS 454.210) is just as valid as service upon the
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CONTESTED CASES AND DISCOVERY.
Once the Complaint is served, the defendant, pursuant to CR 4.02 and 12.01, has 20 days
to file a responsive pleading. In addition to the standard general denial, counterclaims seem to be
increasingly utilized by sophisticated debtor counsel to stall and delay what may otherwise appear to
be a valid claim. The counterclaim ofcourse has the additional chilling effect ofexposing the creditor
to additional defense costs, including discovery expenses. This is particularly true where the
counterclaim seeks affinnative relief against the creditor over and above set-off of the creditor's
stated claim. Aggressive and effective pre-litigation collection efforts and investigation will help
reduce the odds of the nuisance answer and counterclaim which by design may be asserted for
purposes ofdelay, and the imminent threat ofadditional expense.
In the event ofeither a general denial or a counterclaim, creditor's counsel is well advised to
promptly serve initial written discovery to flush out true defenses and help distinguish between real
and frivolous counterclaims. Effective written discovery may have the desirable effect afforcing the
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debtor to expend time and expense, thereby posturing the case for settlement. While depositions may
be more effective, they are certainly more expensive and may lead to additional time delays.
Collection counsel handling large volumes of collection work should prepare good
standardized interrogatories, requests for admissions and requests for production ofdocuments, all
pursuant to CR 33, Interrogatories to Parties, CR 36, Requests for Admissions, and CR 34,
Production of Documents and Things and Entry Upon Land for Inspection and Other
Purposes. An example standardized set of initial written discovery requests is attached herewith
(Attachment No.4). Standardized discovery requests can be a quick and effec~ive means ofmoving
the case closer to settlement or trial and should be edited depending upon the facts ofeach case. An
often overlooked fact is that although a deposition cannot be taken by the plaintiffpursuant to CR
30.01 prior to the expiration of 30 days after seIVice of the summons upon any defendant,
interrogatories, requests for admissions and requests for production of documents may be served
upon any party with or after service of the summons upon that party. Accordingly, counsel who
anticipates defense ofan action may wish to serve written discovery upon the debtor together with
Summons and Complaint.
The sooner counsel initiates discovery the better. Time delays benefit only the debtor. Delay
hinders the creditor for the obvious reason that the creditor bears the burden ofproofin establishing
its claim to collect. Collection attorneys handling high volumes ofwork are well familiar with the
problems associated with pursuing a collection case that has become "bogged down." Problems
include:
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(a) Witnesses becoming unavailable, including witnesses for the plaintiffleaving
the plaintiff's employ;
(b) Inefficient file and/or document retention systems by the creditor, including
missing or" mispl~ced proofs of delivery, original invoice copies, or other
important documentary evidence to prove the claim; and
(c) Creditor "fatigue" or loss of interest in pursuing a collection claim. It is
common for clients to lose interest when it comes time to produce witnesses
for a deposition or trial, or incur substantial time and expense associated with
the continued prosecution ofthe contested collection suit.
c. PROTECfIVE ORDERS.
Occasionally, creditor's counsel will be' confronted with an aggr~ssive and seemingly
overzealous debtor's attorney. Examples may include debtor's counsel seeking depositions from
numerous representatives ofthe plaintifffor the apparent express purpose ofcausing the creditor to
expend substantial sums of money and time. CR 26.03, Protective Orders may offer some relief:
Some ofthe Kentucky cases offering some guidance include, Hoffman v. Dow Chemical Co., Ky.,
413 S.W.2d 332 (1967). A protective order should be issued where the information can be obtained
by interrogatories. Gevedon v. Gri2sby, Ky., 303 S.W.2d 282 (1957). The trial judge exercised
a sound discretion in refusing to attempt to require the appearance ofa nonresident witness to give
his deposition. Wilson v. Lamb, E.D. Ky., 125 FRD 142 (1989). Depositions ofthe officers ofa
civil defendant corporation are to be taken at the defendant's principal place ofbusiness in Michigan
where it would be very inconvenient for the officers to travel to Kentucky to be deposed, as they have
no occasion to travel to the area regularly, or even sporadically on business, and where the plaintiff
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has not responded to the defendant's motion for a protective order to require the depositions to be
taken in Michigan.
One ofthe best ·cases on this point is Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dickinson, Ky., 29 S.W.3d
796 (2000). In referencing protective orders issued under CR 26.03, the Wal-Mart Court advised
that ifa party believes numerous requests for depositions are unduly burdensome or requested for the
purpose ofannoyance, such party can seek a protective order citing the reasons why such requests
for depositions and/or interrogatories are redundant, repetitive, oppressive, or unduly burdensome.
D. ATTEl\1.PTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
As most creditors' attorneys are all too painfully aware, summary judgment has become
elusive in the Commonwealth ofKentucky. Since 1991, when the Kentucky Supreme Court decided
Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Ky., 807 S.W.2d 476 (1991), attorneys have been hard-
pressed to meet the required burden ofproofto obtain summaryjudgment. In part, the case provides
that a summaryjudgment should be granted when "as a matter of law, it appears that it would be
impossible for the respondent to produce evidence at the trial warranting a judgment in his
favor against the movant." As one might imagine, few trial judges are willing to enter a summary
judgment and deprive the debtor of his day in court if there is even the slightest fact in dispute.
Counsel's best chance ofobtaining summaryjudgment may lie in those instances where the defendant
has failed to properly.respond to discovery, or has failed to deny requests for admissions as provided
in CR 36.02: Effect ofAdmission. In addition, where the debtor has failed to respond to discovery,
CR 37 may enable counsel to first seek an order to compel and/or an order to strike the debtor's
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answer and enter judgment. A sample motion for sum.TJ1ary judgment based upon the defendant's
failure to deny requests for admissions, and the deemed admission thereof: is attached hereto
(Attachment No.5).
E. PREPARATIoN FOR TRIAL.
Assuming all pre-trial settlement efforts have been exhausted, discovery has been completed,
and summaryjudgment has been attempted, it is time to complete all pre-trial procedures so that the
case can be set for trial. CR 16: Pre-Trial Procedures; Formulating the Issues, provides in
pertinent part:
(1) In any action, the court may in its discretion direct the attorneys for the
parties to appear before it for a conference to consider:
(a) the simplification of the issues;
(b) the necessity or desirability of amendments to tbe pleadings;
(c) the possibility of obtaining admissions of fact and
documents which will avoid unnecessary proof;
(d) the limitation of the number of expert witnesses;
(e) the advisability ofa preliminary reference of issues
to a Commissioner;
(f) such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the
action.
Counsel should inquire of the court in which the action is pending as to any local rules or
other local procedural requirements regarding pre-trial procedure. Assuming the creditor is prepared
to proceed to trial, a pre-trial conference not otherwise required by the presiding judge may simply
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lead to additional time delays. Sometimes there may be benefits to be considered which include: (1)
additional pressure upon the debtor to resolve the pending litigation through settlement, (2) pressure
from the court for a settlement if it appears obvious to the court that there are no genuine defenses,
and (3) a final determination by the trial judge as to the total number ofwitnesses for trial as well as
the relevant facts to be tried and any governing law. This better assures no surprises at trial.
F. EVIDENTIARY ISSUES DURING TRIAL.
As counsel prepares the matter for trial, it is time to again review the particular strengths and
weaknesses ofthe case. Factors will include the availability ofwitnesses with firsthand knowledge
who are able to (1) prove the necessary elements of the creditor's claim, (2) refute the debtor's
allegations and defenses, and (3) authenticate the documentary evidence in support ofthe creditor's
claim. Counsel should be familiar with the various evidentiary rules that will undoubtedly come into
play during the course ofa contested collection suit. Pertinent portions ofthe Kentucky Rules of
Evidence (KRE) include Article VI - Witnesses, which states at Section 602 that personal
knowledge ofeach witness must be shown (experts excepted). Most commercial collection cases will
not require expert testimony. Witnesses for the creditor should be prepared to testify as to events
ofwhich they have·firsthand knowledge. Counsel should prepare any prospective witnesses so that
an appropriate foundation can be made to establish the competency ofthe witness to properly testify
as to the facts in support ofthe plaintiff's claim. Witnesses should testify as to specific facts rather
than as to opinion. Generally,_ opinion testimony of lay witnesses will be extremely limited and will
result in a multitude ofobjections tending to fluster the witness.
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Counsel should anticipate being faced in many instances with the very real possibility of
attempting to establish facts from witnesses who are salespersons, credit managers or controllers with
limited or incomplete firsthand knowledge of all underlying facts. Some collection practitioners
attempt to utilize the debtor as the principal witness. Most would agree that depending upon the
debtor as the creditor's primary witness to prove the essential elements of the case is risky at best.
While an exhaustive review ofall ofthe rules ofevidence is beyond the scope ofthis outline,
creditor's counsel can rest assured that there will be objections during the course ofthe case based
upon hearsay. One ofthe principal exceptions to the hearsay rule on which the creditor's counsel will
rely is provided at KRE Article VIII - Hearsay, Section 803(6), relating to business records. In
pertinent part, the section provides:
Business Records (Includes all business, professions, and callings. Requirements:
record, in any form; made at or near time by, or from information transmitted
by, a person with knowledge; kept in course of regularly conducted business;
regular practice just to record; all as shown by testimony of custodian or other
qualified witness; unless source of information or method of preparation show
lack of trustworthiness).
In order to be admissible, records (with limited exception) must be identified and
authenticated pursuant to Article IX, Section 901 - Authentication and Identification.
Authentication is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter is what its
proponent claims. Illustrations provided in the rule include but are not limited to authentication or
identification by testimony ofthe witness who acknowledged t~at the matter is what it is claimed to
be. Counsel should be prepared to introduce the business records, including statements, invoices, and
any other documentary evidence in support ofthe creditor's claim through testimony ofa custodian
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or other qualified witness. Selfauthentication is sometimes possible in certain instances as set forth
at Article IX, Section 902, Self Authentication of Business Records. This rule would require
certified original or duplicates of business records to be submitted in advance, with notice to the
adverse party, and made available to the adverse party for inspection in time for the adverse party to
review and challenge. For purposes of the rule, certify for a domestic record means a written
declaration under oath subject to penalty ofperjury.
VII. CONCLUSION
Suffice to say, a collection practitioner's job sometimes only really begins upon the entry of
judgment. While one would hope every collection suit would be easily resolved once the summons
has been served) this rarely is the case. While default judgments are not traditionally favored in the
law) the fact is that the most collection proceedings result in the entry ofdefault judgment. Generally
speaking) the easier it is to obtain the judgment, the harder it is going to be to collect.
Post-judgment collections would be the next topic ofdiscussion. Post-judgment techniques
and the various processes employed by collection counsel are being 'covered separately in this
program, and thus will not be covered in this outline.
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LAW OFFICES
LLOYD & MCDANIEL, PLC
A PROFESSIONAL LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY
462 South Fourth Avenue, Suite 1700
Louisville, Kentucky 40202-3450
October 15, 2001
VIA FAXAND FIRST CLASS MAIL
Honest John Creditor
1234 Main Street
Anywhere, USA
Re: Your File No. KY39253
Our File No. 1732013
Honest John Creditor Services, Inc.
vs: Don Deadbeat
$8,500.00
Dear John:
Telephone: (502) 585-1880
Facsimile: (502) 585-3054
E-Mail: Email@Lloydmc.com
WEBSITE: www.lloydmc.com
The above captioned collection claim has been received. Demand was made immediately upon
receipt of the transmittal papers. We are attempting to establish personal contact with the debtor to obtain
payment in full. The matter is accepted as a contingent collection case for the recovery of the balance due,
on the terms set forth on the contingent fee agreement attached hereto. Please sign and return the agreement
as soon as possible. Ifthere is a written contract, or other pertinent documentation not yet provided, please
send any other information in support ofyour claim.
Ifyou are seeking any special remedies, including but not limited to mechanic's lien filings, notices
ofintent, reclamation ofproperty, possession ofproperty, or any other special remedies, we reserve the right
to negotiate separate fees for these services. We will not attempt enforcement of any' of the enumerated
special remedies, and will limit our efforts to the recovery of the balance due, unless and until specifically
requested and authorized to do so.
Please advance your file at this time 30 days in anticipation ofan initial report which will enable us
sufficient time to attempt personal contact with the debtor so that we may make an informed legal
recommendation for further handling.
Yours truly,
LLOYD & McDANIEL
By:
JAMES M. LLOYD
[Direct Dial (502) 625-9263]
.james@lloydmc.coni
JML/mjo
OUR FEDERAL TAX ID IS 61-0861142
. 41'!ACHMENINa 1
CONTINGENT FEE CONTRACT
Your firm has chosen to employ Lloyd & McDaniel, PLC for the collection of an account balance
due. Lloyd & McDaniel, PLC upon beginning work has a vested interest in the underlying collection claim
pursuant to this contingency fee agreeme~t. Our fees will be computed at the rate of__% against all
recoveries, with the exception ofany costs you advance. Costs which you have advanced will be returned
upon full recovery ofthe matter or at the conclusion ofany settlement. In the event we have advanced any
Court costs or other expenditures authorized by your firm, we will deduct those costs from first recoveries
made. Should you be entitled to special interest, collection costs, or attorney's fees, every effort will be
made to make a full recovery on your behalf. Please understand that while you may have an agreement for
the payment of collection costs and attorney's fees, our fees will be calculated upon all recoveries made,
regardless of whether we are successful in collecting all collection costs or attorney's fees. Our fees will
be assessed against any recoveries made subsequent to our involvement, whether paid directly to your office
or through this office. As funds are recovered we will remit the net amount, less our fee, together with a
voucher outlining the recovery as well as calculation of our fees and any expenses withheld.
Careful effort should be made to refer any contacts by your customer to this office. Continued
contact with your customer will tend to dilute our efforts on your behalfand could impede recovery. Every
effort will be made to establish contact with your customer to attempt to effect voluntary payment, unless
you have instructed otherwise. We will attempt to determine ifthere is any dispute to the claim which could
result in a defense should a lawsuit be filed. In addition, should we determine the possibility ofa counter-
claim, or the threat of a counter-claim, we will notify you in advance for review and investigation.
Should a counter-claim be asserted after a suit has been filed, you may elect to employ this firm for
the defense of the counterclaim, or may retain defense counsel ofyour own choosing, OUf normal hourly
defense rate is $ per hour. Please be aware that this includes travel time, in the event that we are
required to attend out oftown depositions or court proceedings relating to the counter-claim. These charges
would be billed to your finn on a monthly basis. Your finn will be billed on a time-basis for time expended
in the course of the defense of the counterclaim. You will not be ch"arged for time expended with the
prosecution of the underlying collection suit.
(Firm Signature)
Date: -------------ATTACHMENTlYO. 2
NO. 98CI-000789
HONEST JOHN CREDITOR
vs.
DON DEADBEAT
COMPLAINT
******
BOONE DISTRICT COURT
DIVISION
PLAINTIFF
DEFENDANT
Comes the Plaintiff, by counsel, and for its cause ofaction against the Defendant states as follows:
1. The Defendant is indebted to the Plaintiff in the amount of$19,500.00, as evidenced by the
attachment hereto referenced as Exhibit "A."
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffdemands:
1. Judgment against the Defendant in the sum of$19,500.00;
2. Interest thereon at the rate of 19.8% per annum from March 25, 1997 and 19.8% per annum
from the date of Judgment, until the Judgment is satisfied;
3. For Plaintiffs costs herein expended, including a reasonable attorney's fee as the proofmay
allow;
4. For all other relief to which the Plaintiff may appear entitled.
JAMES M. LLOYD
LLOYD & McDANIEL, PLC
Attorneys for Plaintiff
462 South Fourth Avenue, Suite 1700
Louisville, Kentucky 40202-3450
(502) 585-1880
ATTACHMENTNO.3
AFFIDA VIT OF CLAIM
The undersigned, being duly sworn, states that:
1. The unpaid balance due HONEST JOHN CREDITOR
is $19,500.00 as of March 25, 1997 at an interest rate of
19.8%.
2. Demand has been made but payment has not been received.
3. There are no set offs, or credits for which credit has not already been given.
4. I am an employee and/or agent of the Plaintiff and am a qualified person who is
familiar with the business records of the Plaintiff. The said business records are
made at the time ofoccurrence, are kept in the regular course of business, and it is
part of the regular course of business of the Plaintiff to keep such records.
5. I have personal knowledge of the facts stated herein on my review of the business
records of the Plaintiff.
Signed: _
Subscribed and sworn to before me this _ day of__, 2001.
Notary Public
My Commission Expires: _
NO. 01 CI-000123
HONEST JOHN CREDITOR
BOONE CIRCUIT COURT
DIVISION
PLAINTIFF
vs. PLAINTIFF'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES,
REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS AND
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
DON DEADBEAT
* * * * * *
DEFENDANT
The Plaintiffrequests the following discovery ofDefendant, DON DEADBEAT, pursuant
to Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure 33, 34, and 36. Defendant is directed to serve its verified
answers, and to produce the requested documents in conformance with the above-cited rules, on
or before thirty (30) days from the date certified below, at the law offices of Lloyd & McDaniel,
462 South Fourth Avenue, Suite 1700, Louisville, Kentucky 40202-3450.
INSTRUCTIONS AND DEFINITIONS
1. For the purposes of these discovery requests, the following definitions apply:
A. "Plaintiff" means HONEST JOHN CREDITOR.
B. "Defendant" means DON DEADBEAT, as well as any person who is, was,
purports or has purported to be. a general partner, limited partner, affiliate, employee, agent,
attorney, accountant, assignee, subsidiary, or representative of DON DEADBEAT
C. "Person" means, without limiting the generality of its meaning, natural
persons, groups of natural persons (such as a committee or board of directors), corporations,
partnerships, associations, joint ventures, and any other incorporated or unincorporated business,
governmental, public, or social entity.
D. The tenn "document" means the ~riginal and each non-identical copy ofany
writing, tape, disc, recording or other item on which or from which information, communications
or data may be perceived or obtained.
2. Whenever appropriate in these discovery reque~ts, the singular and plural forms of
words shall be interpreted interchangeably so as to brin.g within the scope of these requests any
matter which might otherwise be construed to be outside their scope.
ATTACHMENTNO.4
3. Unless otherwise indicated, these discovery requests apply to the time period
commencing January 1, 2001, through the present.
4. Except as expressly provided in a particular discovery request, all of the terms
utilized in these discovery requests shall have the meaning given to them in the Kentucky Rules
of Civil Procedure.
INTERROGATORIES
Interrogatory No.1
Identify each person who was interviewed, consulted about, or participated in, the
preparation or formulation ofthe Defendant's response to each ofthese discovery requests, and the
date these discovery requests were answered. Ifmore than one person answered these discovery
requests, list for each person the specific discovery request which he or she answered.
Interrogatory No.2
State the social security number of the individual answering these discovery requests or,
if a corporation, state the tax identification number.
Interrogatory No.3
Identify each document, that was reviewed, examined, or relied upon in preparing and
fonnulating the Defendant's response to each ofthese discovery requests, attaching copies ofeach
document pursuant to the request for production.
Interrogatory No.4
State whether the Defendant has ever transacted business with the Plaintiff under a name
other than DON DEADBEAT. If yes, as to each such name, state: (a) name the Defendant used;
(b) the address of the principal place or business of the operations under such name; and (c) the
legal composition of Defendant.
Interrogatory No.5
State whether the claim asserted by the Plaintiff is the obligation ofa person other than the
Defendant. If yes, as to each such obligation, state: (a) the name, address and telephone number
ofsuch other person; (b) the Defendant's relationship to such other person; and (c) the basis for the
Defendant's assertion that the claim asserted by the Plaintiffis the obligation ofa person other than
the Defendant.
Interrogatory No.6
With respect to each person that the Defendant will or may call as a witness to give
testimony at any hearing or trial of this case, state: (a) the name and address ofeach person; (b) a
detailed summary of the testimony expected to be offered by each person; and (c) the connection
or relationship to the Defendant of each person.
Interrogatory No.7
Review the attached invoices, referenced and attached as Exhibit "A". For each item listed
explain if the charge is owed, and if not why not, detailing w~~h particularity your dispute and/or
defense to any the charge.
Interrogatory No.8
State fully, completely and at length the factual basis ofeach defense which you now assert
or intend to assert in this action.
Interrogatory No.9
As to each defense set out in response to Interrogatory Eight (8), above, state the following
as to notification to Plaintiffby Defendant ofsuch defenses: (a) the date or dates when notification
was given; (b) the manner in which notification was given; and (c) the specific party or parties to
whom notification was given.
Interrogatory No. 10
What balance is reflected on the Defendant's books and records or other accounts payable
records as due and o\ving the Plaintiff. Please attach copies of any accounts payable records,
including any computer records or printouts reflecting any balance due the Plaintiff.
REQUESTS TO ADMIT FACTS
The Plaintiff requests that the Defendant answer the following requests to admit facts
pursuant to, and in accordance with, Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure 36. If the Defendant
objects to any requested admission, the reasons therefor shall be stated. The Defendant's answer
shall specifically admit or deny the requested admission, or set forth in detail the reasons why the
Defendant cannot truthfully admit or deny the requested admission. A denial shall fairly meet the
substance ofthe requested admission, and when good faith requires that the Defendant qualify an
answer or deny only a part of the matter ofwhich an admission is requested, the Defendant shall
specify so much of it as is true and qualify or deny the remainder, again detailing the specificity
of the denial or the part thereof.
Fact No. 1
That Defendant has now received originals or copies of each invoice and the statement of
account (copies also hereto attached as Exhibit "A") which are the subject ofPlaintiffs Complaint.
Fact No.2
That Plaintiff furnished the goods and/or performed the services set out in the invoices
and statement of account, and at the prices shown.
Fact No. 3
That the total charges of the subject invoices, as shown on the attached statement of
account, were in the sum of$19,500.00.
Fact No.4
That all of Plaintiffs invoices, statement, and billing on this account were directed and
mailed to Defendant, and received by Defendant.
Fact No.5
Written demand for payment of the charges subject of this action was made upon
Defendant by Plaintiff or Plaintiffs counsel thirty (30) days or more prior to the filing of the
Complaint in this action.
Fact No.6
Except as shown in the Complaint or attachments and exhibits hereto, Defendant is not
entitled to any credits, offsets or deductions.
Fact No.7
Defendant executed the credit application attached hereto as Exhibit "B".
~ .
Fact No.8
Defendant is indebted to the Plaintiff for the sum of$19,500.00
DOCUMENTS TO BE PRODUCED
1. All documents requested to be identified in the foregoing discovery requests.
2. All documents reviewed, relied upon, or used in the preparation ofresponses to the
foregoing discovery requests.
3. All documents which the Defendant intends to introduce at any tr~al or hearing in
this matter.
4. All reports, summaries, analyses, memoranda, documents or other business records
maintained by the Defendant, reflecting any balance due to the Plaintiffs firm.
5. Copies ofany credits, returns, payments or any indicia ofpayment, setoff, or credit
of any kind to which Defendant"would maintain" entitlement, and which Defendant contends has
not already been posted to the account.
6. All correspondence between the Defendant and the Plaintiff for the period from
January I, 200 I, through tile filing of the Complaint in this action.
JAMES M. LLOYD
LLOYD & McDANIEL, PLC
Attorneys for Plaintiff
462 South Fourth Avenue, Suite 1700
Louisville, Kentucky 40202-3450
(502) 585-1880
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing was mailed on August 24, 2001 to Joe
Attorney, 1234 Main Street, Louisville, KY 40202.
JAMES M. LLOYD
LLOYD & McDANIEL, PLC
Attorneys for Plaintiff
95-31021P508P/JML
NO.OICI-000123
HONEST JOHN CREDITOR
BOONE CIRCUIT COURT
DIVISION
PLAINTIFF
vs. PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
DON DEADBEAT·
MOTION
DEFENDANT
Comes the Plaintiff, by counsel, pursuant to Court Rule 56, and moves the Court to grant
it a summary judgment against the Defendant. In support of its motion, Plaintiff attaches hereto
and files herewith its Memorandum ofLa\v. As grounds for said motion, Plaintiffstates that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and therefore as a matter of law is entitled to judgment.
JAMES M. LLOYD
LLOYD & McDANIEL, PLC
Attorneys for Plaintiff
462 South Fourth Avenue, Suite 1700
Louisville, Kentucky 40202-3450
(502) 585-1880
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify th~t a copy of the foregoing was mailed on _ day of
, 2001 to Joe Attorney, 1234 Main Street, Louisville, KY 40202.-------
JAMES M. LLOYD
LLOYD & McDANIEL, PLC
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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NO.OICI-000123
HONEST JOHN CREDITOR
BOONE CIRCUIT COURT
DIVISION
PLAINTIFF
vs.
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
DON DEADBEAT
*** *** ***
DEFENDANT
This matter stands before the Court on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment on
Plaintiffs claim for collection of a balance due in the sum of$19,500.00. The Plaintiff supports
its cause of action with an affidavit of claim substantiating a balance of $19,500.00.
In response to Plaintiffs Complaint, the Defendant filed an answer which is merely a
general denial. Following receipt ofDefendant's Answer, Plaintiffcertified discovery requests to
the Defendant on June 15, 2001, to which there has been no response. Defendant's failure to
respond to Plaintiffs discovery requests, specifically Request to Admit Fact No.6, represents an
admission of said discovery requests pursuant to C.R. 36, and in effect precludes Defendant
establishing the existence of a genuine issue as to any material fact.
ARGUMENT
I. Defendant's deemed admission ofPlaintiffs discovery requests, inc/llding Request to
Admit Fact No.6, precludes ti,e existence ofany genuine issue as to any materialfact.
Kentucky law has long held that a party who is served with a request for admission to
which it does not respond, admits the allegations asserted therein. This provision is clearly set
forth in Court Rule 36.01 which provides in pertinent part as follows:
A party may serve upon any other party a written request for
admission ... each matter for which an admission is requested ... is
deemed admitted unless, within thirt)' days after service of that
request, ... the party to whom the request is directed serves upon the
party requesting the admission a written answer or objection ...
This rule has been upheld in numerous decisions which have been hand~d down by this Court.
Further, the court in Commonwealth v. Rice, Ky., 415 S.W.2d 618 (1966), held that "[f]ailure to
respond properly to Court Rule 36.01 may constitute an admission justifying the granting of a
summary judgment or directed verdict." Smather v. May, Ky., 379 S.W.2d 230 (1964).
Plaintiffproperly served its Requests for Admissions on the Defendant by placing same in
the United States Mail on June 15,2001. Neither the Plaintiff nor its counsel has received the
Defendant's response to the subject Requests for Admissions. Therefore, pursuant to Court Rule
36.01, the Defendant is deemed to have admitted each admission served upon it by the Plaintiff.
And, these admissions may be used as the basis for granting a Summary Judgment in favor ofthe
Plaintiff and against the Defendant.
II. Plaintiffis entitled to Summary Judgment as a matter oflaJv.
This action is filed by Plaintifffor the collection ofan unpaid balance pursuant to contract.
The Plaintiffs claim is supported by its statement ofaccount as well as an affidavit. In response,
the Defendant has filed an Answer but has railed to respond to Plaintiffs discovery requests,
thereby being deemed to have admitted Plaintiffs Requests for Admissions, which includes the
admission of the balance outstanding.
The Defendant has failed to present any affirmative evidence that would create a genuine
issue ofmaterial fact for trial. Therefore, Plaintiff is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
The purpose of the rule providing for summary judgment is to promote the expeditious
disposition of cases and to avoid" unnecessary trials when no genuine issues of material facts are
raised. Steelvest, Inc. v. ScansteeI Service Center, 807 S.W.2d 476, 480 (Ky. 1991). Moreover,
a motion for summary judgment may be based solely upon the pleadings and affidavits submitted
by the parties, and it is not precluded by a denial contained in the answer ofthe defendant. Smith
v. Hilliard, 408 S.W.2d 440, 442 (Ky. 1966).
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided for in C.R. 56,
an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations and denials of its pleadings, but his
response must set forth specific facts showing there is no genuine issue for trial. 7 Clay, Kentucky
Practice, Third Edition, Section 251. Once the movant has established his right to recovery, by
affidavit or otherwise, the opposing party must "present at least some affirmative evidence showing
that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial." Steelvest, 807 S.W.2d at 483 (citations
omitted).
A summary judgment should be granted when, "as a matter of law, it appears that it would
be impossible for the respondent to produce evidence at the trial warranting ajudgment in his favor
against the movant." Steelvest, 807 S.W.2dat483 (citing Paintsville Hospital v. Rose, 683 S.W.2d
255 [Ky. 1985]). Furthermore, when the adverse party cannot prevail, the court's duty is to "render
a judgment forthwith [as] there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Bennett v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph, 407
S.W.2d 403, 405 (Ky. App. 1966).
CONCLUSION
This is a simple collection action for the payment ofan unpaid balance due. The Plaintiff
states that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. Further; the Plaintiff submits that it is
. .
impossible for the Defendant to produce any evidence which will create an issue ofmaterial fact,
which would warrant a judgment in favor of the Defendant or which will prevent the entrance of
a judgment in favor of the Plaintiff. Therefore, Plaintiff moves the Court to enter a judgment in
its favor granting all relief sought in its Complaint.
JAMES M. LLOYD
LLOYD & McDANIEL, PLe
Attorneys for Plaintiff
462 South Fourth Avenue, Suite 1700
Louisville, Kentucky 40202-3450
(502) 585-1880
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a copy ofthe foregoing was mailed on _ day of , 2001
to Joe Attorney, 1234 Main Street, Louisville, KY 40202.
JAMES M. LLOYD
LLOYD & McDANIEL, PLC
Attorneys for Plaintiff
95-3102/p622C
NO. 98CI-000789
HONEST JOHN CREDITOR
vs.
DON DEADBEAT
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
BOONE DISTRICT COURT
DIVISION
PLAINTIFF
DEFENDANT
This matter coming before the Court on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, and the
Court having reviewed the pleadings and being otherwise duly and sufficiently advised,
IT Is HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED t~at there are no genuine issues as to any material
fact and that Plaintiff is entitled to Judgment as a matter of law for the sum of $19,500.00, with
interest thereon at the rate of 19.8% per annum from March 25, 1997 and 19.8% per annum from
the date ofJudgment and until this Judgment is satisfied, for an attorney's fee equal to 25% ofthis
Judgment balance, for all costs expended by Plaintiff, for all of which execution may issue
forthwith.
There being no just reason for delay, this Judgment is final and appealable.
JUDGE
DATE
TENDERED By:
JAMES M. LLOYD
LLOYD & McDANIEL, PLC
Attorneys for Plaintiff
462 South Fourth Avenue, Suite 1700
Louisville, Kentucky 40202-3450
(502) 585-1880
AFFIDAVIT
Comes the Affiant, and after having been duly sworn, states as follows:
1. . That the undersigned is a member of the law firm serving as counsel of record
for the Plaintiff herein.
2. That the finn of Lloyd & McDaniel was retained by the Plaintiff for
representation of the Plaintiff in this matter and is not otherwise a regularly salaried employee
of the Plaintiffs firm.
3. That the Plaintiff is entitled to a recovery of a reasonable attorney's fee pursuant
to the terms and conditions, a copy of which is attached hereto.
4. That the Plaintiff has agreed to pay the undersigned firm a contingent attorney's
fee equal to 25% o~the balance.
FURTHER, the Affiant sayeth not.
JAMES M. LLOYD
Subscribed and sworn to before me this __ day of , 2000.
My commission expires: _
NOTARY PUBLIC
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BANKRUPTCY FUNDAMENTALS:
WHAT THE COLLECTION LAWYER MUST KNOW
By Cathy S. Pike
Weber & Rose, P.S.C.
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400.W. Market Street
Louisville, Kentucky 40202
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Introduction
Bankruptcy impacts both collection actions taken prior to bankruptcy and after a
bankruptcy filing. Upon a bankruptcy filing, an automatic stay is imposed which halts all
collection actions by creditors, regardless of whether or not the creditor is scheduled in the
bankruptcy petition. In addition, the bankruptcy filing can unwind collection actions which have
been taken prior to bankruptcy. For example, liens which have been placed, prior to the
bankruptcy filing, against property of the bankruptcy estate, such as garnishments .and judgment
liens, can be set aside and avoided. Moreover, collection actions which occur after a bankruptcy
filing can result in sanctions for willful violation of the automatic stay.
Once a creditor is advised by a debtor that he has filed bankruptcy, the creditor should
obtain the following information from the debtor:
(1) The location of the court in which the bankruptcy filing occurred;
(2) The date of the bankruptcy filing and the case number;
(3) Whether the creditor was listed in the debtor's bankruptcy petition, and the amount
for which the creditor was listed;
(4) The type of bankruptcy which was filed (Chapter 7, Chapter 11, Chapter 12 or
Chapter 13).
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After the filing of a bankruptcy petition under any chapter of the Bankruptcy Code, a first
meeting of creditors is held (the "341 meeting), usually 20-40 days after the filing date. (11
u.s.C. §341) The 341 meeting is conducted by either the Chapter 7 trustee or a representative of
the U.S. Trustee's Office, depending upon the chapter under which the petition was filed. The
3·1-1 meeting is an informal meeting at which the debtor or its representative is sworn and
required to respond to various questions by creditors and the trustee concerning the debtor's
assets, debts and general business operations. It is an invaluable way to obtain information from
the debtor, and to promptly resolve many issues which may exist between debtors and their
creditors.
I. Types of Bankruptcy Cases
The Bankruptcy Code is divided into several chapters, including Chapter 7 (liquidation);
Chapter 11 (business reorganization); Chapter 12 (reorganization by family farmers) and Chapter
13 (reorganization by consumers). Most bankruptcy filings will be either Chapter 7 or Chapter
13 proceedings.
In a Chapter 7 proceeding, the individual debtor I is seeking a discharge of his unsecured
debts, which prevents the creditor from ever being able to collect the obligation from the debtor.
The Chapter 7 discharge acts as permanent injunction, discharging the debtor from all debts
which arose before the date of the bankruptcy filing. (11 U.S.C. §727(b»)
IOnly individual debtors receive a discharge; corporations and other similar-type entities
do not receive a bankruptcy discharge. (11 U.S.C. §727(a))
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In a Chapter 13 proceeding, the individual debtor is seeking to repay his creditors over a
period of time, usually three-to-five years. The Chapter 13 discharge generally discharges the
debtor from all unsecured debts provided for by the Chapter 13 plan or disallowed by the
Bankruptcy Court. (11 U.S.C. §1328)
II. The Automatic Stay
Once a bankruptcy petition is filed under any Chapter, an automatic stay is imposed
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Section 362, which stays the following actions against the debtor and/or
against property of the estate:
(1) the commencemellt or continuation, including the employment of process, of
a judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding against the debtor that was
or could have been commenced before the commencement of the case under this
title, or to recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement
of the case under this title;
(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the estate, of a
judgment obtained before the commencement of the case under this title;
(3) any act to obtain possession ofproperty of the estate or ofproperty from the
estate or to exercise control over property of the estate;
(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the estate;
(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the debtor any lien to
the extent that such lien secures a claim that arose before the commencement of
the case under this title;
(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that arose
before the commencement of the case under this title;
20nly an individual debtor with regular income, or an individual debtor with regular
income and such individual's spouse, that owe, on the date of the filing of the petition,
noncontingent, liquidated, unsecured debts of less than $269,250, and noncontingent, liquidated,
secured debts of less than $807,750 may be a debtor under Chapter 13. (11 U.S.C. §109(e))
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(7) the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose before the
commencement of the case under this title against any claim against the debtor;
and
(8) the commencement of continuation ofa proceeding before the United States
Tax Court concerning the debtor.
Under 11 U.S.C. §362(b), certain types of action against the debtor are not stayed,
including criminal prosecutions, actions to collect alimony or support from the debtor from
property that is not property of the estate and acts to perfect liens IF the perfection is retroactive
to a date prior to the bankruptcy filing.
See, In re Griggs, 965 F.2d 54 (6th Cir. 1992) (perfection of lien post petition); Cumberland
Metals, Inc. v. Kentucky Insurance Guaranty Association, 801 S.W.2d 339 (Ct. App. Ky. 1990)
(stay does not apply to suit against bankrupt contractor's surety); Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission v. Guerdon Industries, 76 BR 102 (U.S. District Ct. Ky. 1987) (governmental unit's
action against debtor not stayed).
The automatic stay generally only protects the debtor from collection attempts; however,
pursuant to 11 U.S. C. §1301(a), the automatic stay imposed in Chapter 13 proceedings protects
co-debtors as well:
Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) of this section, after the order for
relief under this chapter, a creditor may not act, or commence or continue any
civil action, to collect all or any part of a consumer debt of the debtor from any
individual that is liable on such debt with the debtor, or that secured such debt,
unless-
(1) such individual became liable on or secured such debt in the
ordinary course of such individual's business; or
(2) the case is closed, dismissed, or converted to a case under
chapter 7 or 11 of this title.
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III. Property of the Estate
Under 11 U.S.C. §362, the creditor is prohibited from proceeding against "property of the
estate," which pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §541 consists of all of the following property, wherever
located and by whomever held:
(1) ...alilegal and equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the
commencement of the case.
(2) All interests of the debtor and the debtor's spouse in community property as
of the commencement of the case that is -
(A) under the sole, equal, or joint management and control of the
debtor; or
(B) liable for an allowable claim against the debtor, or for both an
allowable claim against the debtor and an allowable claim against
the debtor's spouse, to the extent that such interest is so liable.
(3) Any interest in property that the trustee recovers under section 329(b), 363(n),
543, 550, 553, or 723 of this title.
(4) Any interest in property preserved for the benefit of or ordered transferred to
the estate under section 5IO(c) or 551 of this title.
(5) Any interest in property that would have been property of the estate if such
interest had been an interest of the debtor on the date of the filing of the petition,
and that the debtor acquires or becomes entitled to acquire within 180 days after
such date-
(A) by bequest, devise, or inheritance;
(B) as a result ofa property settlement agreement with the debtor's
spouse, or of an interlocutory or final divorce decree; or
(C) as beneficiary of a life insurance policy or of a death benefit
plan.
(6) Proceeds, product, offspring, rents, or ·profits·of or from property of the estate,
except such as are earnings from services performed by an individual debtor after
the commencement of the case.
(7) Any interest in property that the estate acquires after the commencement of
the case.
The listing of "property of the estate" is fairly inclusive. However, pursuant to 11 U.S.C.
§541(b), property of the estate does not include:
(1) any power that the debtor may exercise solely for the benefit of an entity other
than the debtor;
(2) any interest of the debtor as a lessee under a lease ofnonresidential real
property that has terminated at the expiration of the stated term of such lease
before the commencement of the case under this title, and ceases to include any
interest of the debtor as a lessee under a lease of nonresidential real property that
has terminated at the expiration of the stated term of such lease during the case.
IV. Lien Avoidance
11 U.S.C. §547 permits a bankruptcy trustee or debtor to avoid certain transfers and/or
liens "Nhich occur prior to the bankruptcy filing, subject to certain exceptions set out in 11 U.S.C.
§547(c). In addition, 11 U.S.C. §544 permits the bankruptcy trustee or debtor to use otherwise
applicable state law to avoid certain transfers and/or liens, including Kentucky's preference and
fraudulent conveyance statutes (KRS 378.010 and KRS 378.060).
By way of example, judgment liens and garnishment liens may be set aside, if they were
created within statutorily-prescribed time periods preceding the bankruptcy filing, and were for
more than $600.
Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §547(b), the trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest in the
debtor in property-
(1) to or for the benefit of a creditor;
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(2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before such
transfer 'was made;
(3) made while the debtor was insolvent;
(4) made-
(A) on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the
petition; or
(B) between 90 days and one year before the date of the filing of
the petition, if such creditor at the time of such transfer was an
insider; and
(5) that enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor would receive if
(A) the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title;
(B) the transfer had not been made; and
(C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the extent
provided by the provisions of this title.
Further, 11 U.S.C. §547(c) sets out the defenses which are available:
The trustee may not avoid under this section a transfer-
(1) to the extent that such transfer was
(A) intended by the debtor and the creditor to or for whose
benefit such transfer was made to be a contemporaneous exchange
for new value given to the debtor; and
(B) in fact a substantially contemporaneous exchange;
(2) to the extent such transfer was-
(A) in payment of a debt incurred by the debtor in the ordinary course of
business or finanCIal affairs of the debtor and the transferee;
(B) made in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the
debtor and the transferee; and
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(C) made according to ordinary business terms.
(3) that creates a security interest in property acquired by the
debtor-
(A) to the extent such security interest secures new value that was-
(i) given at or after the signing ofa security
agreement that contains a description of such
property as collateral;
(ii) given by or on behalfof the secured party under
such agreement;
(iii) given to enable the debtor to acquire such
property; and
(iv) in fact used by the debtor to acquire such
property; and .
(B) that is perfected on or before 20 days after the debtor receives
possession of such property.
(4) to or for the benefit of a creditor, to the extent that, after such .
transfer, such creditor gave new value to or for the benefit of the
debtor-
(A) not secured by an otherwise unavoidable security interest; and
(B) on account of which new value the debtor did not make an otherwise
unavoidable transfer to or for the benefit of such creditor;
(5) that creates a perfected security interest in inventory or a
receivable or the proceeds of either, except to the extent that the
aggregate of all such transfers caused a reduction, as of the date of
the filing of the petition and to the prejudice of other creditors
holding unsecured claims, of any amount by which the debt
secured by such s~curity interest exceeded the value of all security
interests for such debt on the later of-
(A) (i) with respect to a transfer to which subsection (b)(4)(A) of this
section applies, 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition; and
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(ii) with respect to a transfer to which subsection (b)(4)(B) of this
section applies, one year before the date of the filing of the petition; or
(B) the date on which new value was first given under the security
agreement creating such security interest;
(6) that is the fixing ofa statutory lien that is not avoidable under
section 545 of this title;
(7) to the extent such transfer was a bona fide payment of a debt to
a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor, for alimony to,
maintenance for, or support of such spouse or child, in connection
with a separation agreement, divorce decree or other order of a
court of record, determination made in accordance with State or
territorial law by a governmental unit, or property settlement
agreement, but not to the extent such debt-
(A) is assigned to another entity, voluntarily, by operation of law, or
otherwise; or
(B) includes a liability designated as alimony, maintenance, or support,
unless such liability is actually in the nature of alimony, maintenance or support;
or
(8) if, in a case filed by an individual debtor whose debts are
primarily consumer debts, the aggregate value of all property that
constitutes or is affected by such transfer is less than $600.
Moreover, 11 U.S.C. §544 provides additional avoidance powers to the trustee:
(a) The trustee shall have, as of the commencement of the case, without regard to
any knowledge of the trustee or of any creditor, the rights and powers of, or may
avoid any transfer of property of the debtor or any obligation incurred by the
debtor that is avoidable by -
(1) a creditor that extends credit to the debtor at the time of the commencement of
the case, and that obtains at such time and with respect to such credit, a judicial
lien on all property on which a creditor on a simple contract could have obtained
such a judicial lien, whether or not such a creditor exists;
(2) a creditor that extends credit to the debtor at the time of the commencement of
the case, and obtains, at such time and with respect to such credit, an execution
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against the debtor that is returned unsatisfied at such time, whether or not such a
creditor exists; or
(3) a bona fide purchaser of real property, other than fixtures, from the debtor,
against whom applicable law permits such transfer to be perfected, that obtains
the status ofa bona fide purchaser and has perfected such transfer at the time of
the commencement of the case, whether or not such a purchaser exists.
(b) (I) Except as provided in paragraph (2), the trustee may avoid any transfer of
an interest of the debtor in property or any obligation incurred by the debtor that is
voidable under applicable law by a creditor holding an unsecured claim that is
allowable under section 502 of this title or that is not allowable only under section
502(e) of this title.
(2) Paragraph (I) shall not apply to a transfer ofa charitable contribution (as
that term is defined in section 548(d)(3) that is not covered under section
548(a)(I)(B), by reason of section 548(a)(2). Any claims by any person to recover
a transferred contribution described in the preceding sentence under Federal or
State law in a Federal or State court shall be preempted by the commencement of
the case. .
The word "transfer" is a term of art and is specifically defined by the statute. Under II
U.S.C.547(e),
(A) a transfer of real property other than fixtures, but including the interest of a
seller or purchaser under a contract for the sale of real property, is perfected when
a bona fide purchaser of such property from the debtor against whom applicable
law permits such transfer to be perfected cannot acquire an interest that is superior
to the interest of the transferee; and
(B) a transfer of a fixture or property other than real property is perfected when a
creditor on a simple contract cannot acquire a judicial lien that is superior to the
interest of the transferee.
A careful reading of the statute reveals that the trustee may avoid a "transfer". For
purposes of garnishment in the Sixth Circuit, the "transfer" occurs when the garnishment order is
delivered to the employer or financial institution. In re Battery One-Stop, Ltd, 36 F.3d 493 (6th
eire 1994); In re Edwards, 219 BR 970 (W.D. Ky. 1998) (referencing KRS 425.506); In re
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Morehead, 249 F.3d 445, at 447 (6th Cir. 2001) (Debtor must have rights in the property before it
can be transferred...debtor must have performed the services to which the garnishment order
attaches.) Consequently, for purposes of determining whether an avoidable preference has
occurred, the key date is the date of delivery of the garnishment order on the employer, financial
irtstitution, etc., NOT the date the funds are actually withdrawn or paid to the creditor.
Moreover, the "applicable law" which is available to the trustee for avoiding transfers,
and which is referenced in 11 U.S.C. §544(b)(I) is KRS 378.010 and KRS 378.060:
378.010 Fraudulent conveyances and encumbrances
Every gift, conveyance, assignment or transfer of, or charge upon, any estate, real
or personal, or right or thing in action, or any rent or profit thereof, made with the
intent to delay, hinder or defraud creditors, purchasers or other persons and every
bond or other evidence ofdeb~ given, action commenced or judgment suffered,
with like intent, shall be void as against such creditors, purchasers and other
persons. This section shall not affect the title of a purchaser for a valuable
consideration, unless it appears that he had notice of the fraudulent intent of his
immediate grantor or of the fraud rendering void tIle title of such grantor.
378.060 Preferential conveyance, encumbrance or other act in contemplation
of insolvency -Effect--Exception
Any sale, mortgage or assignment made by a debtor and any judgment suffered by
a defendant, or any act or device done or resorted to by a debtor" in contemplation
of insolvency and with the design to prefer one or more creditors to the exclusion,
in whole or in part, of others, shall operate as an assignment and transfer of all the
property of the debtor, and shall inure to the benefit of all his creditors, except as
provided in subsection (2) or KS 378.090, in proportion to the amount of their
respective demands including those which are future and contingent. Nothing in
KRS 378.060 to 378.090 shall vitiate or affect any mortgage made in good faith to
secure any debt or liability created simultaneously with the mortgage, if the
mortgage is lodged for record within thirty (30) days after its execution.
Judgment liens can be av~ided by the debtor under 11 U.S.C. §522(f), which provides the
criteria for avoiding a lien, and the methodology for calculating whether the lien does in fact
impair the debtor's exemption:
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(f) (1) Notwithstanding any waiver of exemptions but subject to paragraph (3),
the debtor may avoid the fixing ofa lien on an interest of the debtor in property to
the extend that such lien impairs an exemption to which the debtor would have
been entitled under subsection (b) of this section, if such lien is-
(A) A judicial lien, other than a judicial lien that secured a debt-
(i) to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor, for
alimony to, maintenance for, or support of such spouse or child, in
connection with a separation agreement, divorce decree or other
order of a court ofrecord, determination made in accordance with
State or territorial law by a governmental unit, or property
settlement agreement; and
(ii) to the extent that such deht-
(I) is not assigned to another entity,
voluntarily, by operation of law, or otherwise; and
(II) includes a liability designated as
alimony, maintenance, or support, unless such
liability is actually in the nature of alimony,
maintenance or support; ...
(2) (A) For the purposes of this subsection, a lien shall be considered to
impair an exemption to the extent that the sum of-
(i) the lien;
(ii) all other liens on the property; and
(iii) the amount of the exemption that the debtor could claim if there were no liens
on the property
exceeds the value that the debtor's interest in the property would have in the
absence ofany liens.
(B) In the case of a property subject to more than 1 lien, a lien that has
been avoided shall not be considered in making the calculation under
subparagraph (A) with respect to other liens.
(C) This paragraph shall not apply with respect to a judgment arising out
of a mortgage foreclosure.
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The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has discussed the rationale of 522(f)(2) in In re
Holland, 151 F.3d 547, at 550 (1998):
One of the purposes of bankruptcy is to allow for the fair treatment of similarly
situated creditors, thus preventing creditors' rights from being determined by a
race to the courthouse. Another purpose is to provide the debtor with a fresh start.
It cannot be disputed that if a judgment creditor [were] allowed to retain its lien
on the real property of the debtor...it [would] very likely be able to ascertain the
payment of its debt that other creditors, othen\ise similar to the judgment creditor,
would not be able to obtain. Thus, the judgment creditor [would be] allowed to
circumvent the treatment of other creditors under the Bankruptcy Code simply
because it [had] raced to the courthouse, obtained a judgment, and placed a lien on
the debtor's fully encumbered real property. Further, the debtor would probably
be precluded from ever gaining any equity in the property, therefore impairing his
fresh start.
See, also, In re Brumbaugh, 250 BR 605 (Bankr. W. D. Ky. 2000), which demonstrates the
workings of 11 U.S.C. §522(f)(2).
A creditor confronted with a motion to avoid a lien to the extent it impairs an exemption
has several possible avenues of defense available to it~ including (a) arguments on valuation of
the property; (b) the accuracy and validity of all creditors' liens; and (c) the debtors' entitlement
to claim an exemption in the property (Does the debtor have an ownership interest in the
property, and did he occupy the property on the date of the bankruptcy filing?), etc.
v. Terminatine the Automatic Stay
As stated previously, the automatic stay (11 U.S.C. §362) prevents a creditor from taking
any action to collect debts from the debtor or to reco"er property of the debtor on which it has a
lien or mortgage. The automatic· stay is terminated upon the earliest of (a) the time the case is
closed; (b) the time the case is dismissed; or (c) the time the discharge is granted or denied.
Moreover, tIle automatic stay can be terminated under 11 U.S.C. §362(d):
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On request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the court shall
grant relief from the stay provided under subsection (a) of this section, such as by
terminating, annulling, modifying, or conditioning such stay-
(1) for cause, including the lack ofadequate protection of an
interest in property of such party in interest;
(2) with respect to a stay of an act against property under
subsection (a) of this section, if-
(A) the debtor does not have an equity in such
property; and
(B) such property is not necessary to an effective
reorganization; or
(3) with respect to a stay ofan act against single asset real estate
under subsection (a), by a creditor whose claim is secured by an
interest in such real estate, unless, not later than the date that is 90
days after the entry of the order for relief...---
(A) the debtor has filed a plan of reorganization
that has a reasonable possibility of being confirmed
within a reasonable time; or
(B) the debtor has commenced monthly payments
to each creditor whose claims is secured by such
real estate... ~ which payments are in an amolmt
equal to interest at a current fair market rate on the
value of the creditor's interest in the real estate.
See, In re Brooks, 26 BR 210 (W.D. Ky. 1982) (11 U.S.C. §362(d)(I»; In re Family Investments,
Inc., 8 BR 572 (W.D. Ky. 1981) (11 U.S.C. §362(d)(I) and (d)(2); and In re McIntyre, 20 BR
284 (W.D. Ky. 1982) (11 U.S.C. § 362 (d)(2».
As stated previously, the automatic stay only protects the debtor, unless the bankruptcy is
a Chapter 13 filing, in which event the automatic stay protects co-debtors as well. Consequently,
if there are two obligors and OIlly one has filed bankruptcy, the creditor may proceed against the
non-bankrupt co-obligor.
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The automatic stay may be terminated by either filing a motion to terminate automatic
stay, or by filing an agreed order terminating the automatic stay. In a Chapter 7 proceeding, the
secured creditor must also have the trustee abandon his interest in the property.
VI. Reaffirmation and Redemption
An exception to the debtor's obligation to pay after a bankruptcy filing would be if the
debtor reaffirms a debt (11 U.S.C. §524) or redeems collateral (11 U.S.C. §722), which may
occur when the debt is a co-signed debt and the debtor wishes to protect his co-signer, or when
the debtor believes it likely that the debt will be held to be nondischargeable. These are the
exclusive methods pursuant to which a debtor may retain possession of secured collateral. See,
generally, In re Bell, 700 F.2d 1053 (6th Cir. 1983)
Under 11 U.S.C. §524(c), a debtor may enter into a reaffirmation agreement with its
creditor. Generally, only a creditor's in rem rights remain after a bankruptcy discharge is
granted; however, if a reaffirmation of the debt occurs, the debtor is legally obligated on the
entire obligation, and the creditor is not limited to recovery of the value of its collateral.
Reaffinnation occurs under 11 U.S.C. §524, which provides as follows:
An agreement between a holder of a claim and the debtor, the consideration for
which, in whole or in part, is based on a debt that is dischargeable in a case under
this title is enforceable only to any extent enforceable under applicable
nonbankruptcy law, whether or not discharge of such debt is waived, only if-
(1) such agreement was made before the granting of the
discharge...
(2) (A) such agreement contains a clear and conspicuous
statement which advises the debtor that the agreement may be
rescinded at any time prior to discharge or within sixty days after
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such agreement is filed with the court, whichever occurs later, by
giving notice of such rescission to the holder of such claim; and
(B) such agreements contains a clear and conspicuous
statement which advises the debtor that such agreement is not
required under this title, under nonbankruptcy law, or under any
agreement not in accordance with the provisions of this subsection;
(3) such agreement has been filed with the court and, if applicable,
accompanied by a declaration or an affidavit of the attorney that
represented the debtor during the course ofnegotiating an
agreement under this subsection, which states that-
(A) such agreement represents a fully informed and
voluntary agreement by the debtor;
(B) such agreement does not impose an undue
hardship on the debtor or a dependent of the debtor;
and
(C) the attorney fully advised the debtor of the legal
effect and consequences of-
(i) an agreement of the kind specified in this
subsection; and
(ii) any default under such an agreement...
Even after voluntarily signing the reaffirmation agreement, the debtor can rescind the
agreement within the later of 60 days from the filing with the Bankruptcy Court of the
reaffirmation agreement, or entry of the discharge. Debtors have an absolute right to rescind
reaffirmation agreements. See In re Smith, 35 BR 95 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1983).
The debtor can also redeem collateral by paying to the secured creditor its approximate
fair market value, or the amount of the claim, whichever is less. However, such payment may
not be in installments, and must be a lump-sum payment. In re Bell, 700 F.2d 1053, at 1054.
See In re Burba, 42 F3d 1388, 1994 WL 7093414 (6th Cir. unpublished opinion, addressing
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redemption rights when a Chapter 13 proceeding is converted to Chapter 7); In re Breckinridge,
140 BR 642 (\\'.D. Ky. 1992) (Under Kentucky law, future advance clause in purchase money
security interest was not enforceable as to unrelated subsequent unsecured loan, and thus amount
debtor was required to pay in order to redeem automobile was solely amount owing on auto
loan.)
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